South Korean Civil Society
Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance

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June 2013
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INTRODUCTION

Civil society in South Korea (ROK) is lauded as vibrant, active, and dynamic. On any given afternoon, one only need walk a few blocks in downtown Seoul before encountering a rally, vigil, or protest sponsored by civic groups. When these groups unite as a coalition movement behind a particular cause, thousands of protestors, accompanied on occasion by riot police, may occupy central Seoul.

For policymakers, an important question is whether such large protests and a robust civil society have any bearing on policy.\textsuperscript{1} The existing literature on South Korean civil society presents a mixed record on the effectiveness of civil society in the post-democratization period. While some scholars note its power on South Korean politics, more recent scholarship suggests civil society has little direct effect on policymaking.\textsuperscript{2}

Civil society has often played an important, albeit indirect, role in South Korean policies related to U.S.-ROK relations. This influence has come primarily from progressive civic groups and activists frequently identified by the U.S. foreign policy establishment as “anti-American” in their political views. Civil-societal influence on South Korean policy toward the United States is therefore interpreted as having an adverse effect on U.S.-ROK relations, especially in the short-term. Although this characterization is accurate to the extent that anti-U.S. protests at times highlight if not extenuate alliance discord, the voices of activists and civic groups have also contributed to broader debates concerning U.S.-ROK–related issues. These debates include the future direction of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the domestic impact of bilateral trade, and the role of humanitarian assistance and aid in North Korean policy.

Civil-societal input, while not always welcome by government officials and policy leaders, can act as a barometer of public sentiment on a range of alliance-related issues. As a government watchdog, the roadblocks presented by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) enable wider deliberation and discussion that, in the long run, may promote better policy. Rather than dismiss South Korean civil-societal actors as inconsequential, U.S. policymakers should glean valuable insights on U.S.-ROK relations from a bottom-up perspective by tracking social movement trends and discourse in South Korea.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY\textsuperscript{3}

The strength of South Korean civil society is deeply rooted in the nation’s struggle for democracy. Social movements and protests were woven into Korea’s social fabric beginning with peasant movements of the late Chosun period (nineteenth century) and anti-Japanese resistance during the colonial era (1910–45). However, South Korean civil society and the NGO sector arose in their present form from the democratization movements of the 1970s and 1980s and the reorganization of state-societal relations during the democratic consolidation process of the 1990s.

During the authoritarian period, little political space existed for civil society to flourish. A student uprising on April 19, 1960, brought about the short-lived Second Republic (1960–61), but this brief attempt at democracy ended with Park Chung-hee’s coup d’état in 1961. Park steered South Korea toward state-led rapid industrialization while shutting down civil society. Economic development and improved lifestyles did not usher in greater freedoms. To the contrary, Park unveiled his Yusin Constitution in 1972, which led the regime to further clamp down on civil and political rights. The
regime transformed itself into a security state with a large administrative bureaucracy, distended military, and an enormous national police force. Intelligence operatives were located at “every conceivable site of potential resistance.”

Although Yusin ushered in the “darkest era” of South Korea’s political history, the “legalization of dictatorship” also inspired students, workers, and other groups from various sectors to join a growing underground democracy movement. By the late 1970s, the crisis of civil society erupted into mass open demonstrations. Park’s assassination in 1979 by his own intelligence chief “opened a floodgate of democratic yearnings” across society. Unfortunately, the transitional government after Park’s assassination gave way to martial law under the leadership of General Chun Doo-hwan in early 1980. Despite voices clamoring for a return to civilian rule, martial law expanded to the rest of the country as Chun methodically quashed protests. Government suppression culminated in the brutal crackdown on thousands of protestors in the 1980 Gwangju uprising. By the following year, Chun had purged or politically banned eight hundred politicians and eight thousand civil servants and business officials. More than thirty-seven thousand individuals, including students, teachers, journalists, labor organizers, pastors, and civil servants, were sent to purification camps in remote mountains for reeducation and hard labor.

After nearly three years of severe state repression, the regime relaxed its grip. Riot police withdrew from campuses, political bans were lifted, demonstrating students returned to class, and National Assembly elections were held in 1985. The thaw enabled students to restore antigovernment groups, with students organizing the National Student Coalition for Democracy Struggle, the first nationwide student organization since the April 1960 uprising. Labor unions and church groups that had engaged in pro-democracy struggles before martial law also reorganized. Most importantly, a broad alliance between student, labor, and religious organizations coalesced under the national umbrella organization, the People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification. This triple alliance (student-labor-church), joined by tens of thousands of middle-class and white-collar protestors in 1987, helped political opposition leaders pressure the Chun regime to step down and hold direct presidential elections.

The democracy movement of the 1970s and 1980s is critical to our understanding of South Korean civil society today. It was at the height of authoritarianism in which civil society came of age. Many of the modern ideas, political beliefs, social networks, and movement tactics of civil-societal leaders were shaped during this period. One of the legacies of the democracy movement, which would later have a bearing on U.S.-ROK relations, was the growth of different leftist ideologies. Although the tendency is to lump the South Korean left into one category, different factions still exist based on ideological divisions arising out of the 1980s. The two most important ideological strands were the National Liberation (NL) and People’s Democracy (PD). The NL believed in North Korea’s brand of self-reliance and rallied against American imperialism. This strand gained momentum following the Gwangju uprising with activists linking the United States as an accomplice to the brutal crackdown. Meanwhile, the PD faction, which drew its inspiration from Marxist-Leninist ideology, emphasized class warfare and the empowerment of workers. Of the two strands, the NL and activist networks that coalesced under NL ideology in the 1980s would have a greater bearing on U.S.-ROK interests in the 2000s.
GROWTH OF CIVIL SOCIETY, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND U.S.-ROK RELATIONS IN THE POST-DEMOCRATIZATION PERIOD

Civil-societal actors continued to press the government on democratic reforms following direct presidential elections in 1987, but they also began to tackle a wider range of issues, including economic justice, women’s rights, the environment, and peace and reunification. The turn to “new social movements” helped civil society flourish in the 1990s, but it also led to a paradoxical decline in cohesion within civil society absent the unifying target of authoritarian rule.

In the 1990s, segments of civil society organized into simin danche, large civic or citizens’ groups. Citizens’ movement organizations pushed for broad economic, political, and social reforms. These groups often acted as government watchdogs while representing the interests and voice of ordinary citizens. The two most prominent groups to emerge were the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) in 1989 and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) in 1994. Expanding beyond protest movements, these groups also conducted research, organized public advocacy and awareness campaigns, and engaged political leaders. Although progressive in their political orientation, these groups remained fairly “conservative” in their approach to social movements, relying on both formal (e.g., party politics, lobbying, elections) and informal (e.g., strikes, vigils, protests) means of politics to achieve their aims. They differed from the more radical grassroots NGOs and civic groups that relied almost entirely on informal politics. Both types of civil-societal organizations often joined hands in coalition campaigns where issue areas converged.

Civil society has grown over the past decade: In June 2000, there were 2,193 registered nonprofit civic groups; this number increased to 10,362 by March 2012. It should be kept in mind, however, that only a small percentage of these groups engage in political activity with direct bearing on politics. This rapid growth of civil society was partially aided by the sequential progressive governments of Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), which welcomed civil-societal participation in South Korean politics, even if state-society relations remained ambivalent. With roots to the earlier democracy movements, the majority of politically active civil-societal groups emerging during this period remained on the progressive end of the political spectrum. However, the progressive agenda of the Roh administration also prompted the growth of conservative civic groups as part of the New Right movement launched in 2004.

Table 1 highlights some of the largest civic groups active today as well as a sample of smaller civic groups and NGOs that have engaged in issues directly relevant to U.S.-ROK relations in the past decade. The list is intended for illustrative purposes and is by no means an exhaustive survey of current civic groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization15</th>
<th>Year Organized</th>
<th>Membership Size16</th>
<th>Political Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun)</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>Moderate left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>Moderate left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Korea United (GKU)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>Moderate left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>No formal membership; 1–2 full time staff</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Solidarity for a Participatory Democracy (PSPD)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>Moderate left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>693,66217</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (CANKHR)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>No Formal Membership; 6–8 full time staff</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Network</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>No formal membership; 2 full time staff</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens United for a Better Society (CUBS)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Wind</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>No formal membership; 2–4 full time staff</td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Websites of respective organizations.18

As one of the most recognized civic groups, PSPD has participated in several major coalition campaigns related to U.S.-ROK issues. Its thirteen thousand-member base includes lawyers, professors, teachers, students, professionals, and other citizens interested in progressive issues. U.S.-ROK issues are usually addressed by PSPD’s peace and disarmament center, which organizes forums, produces research analysis, and helps mobilize protests on issues such as ROK defense spending, U.S. base relocation, North Korean nuclear negotiations, and the U.S.-ROK alliance.19 It consistently takes a position that promotes a more self-reliant foreign policy, reduces U.S. military presence, and supports peaceful dialogue and relations with North Korea. The nature of PSPD’s work focuses more on research, education, and public advocacy than on organizing campaign protests. However, when active in coalition movements, its staff or members help facilitate mass mobilization.

SPARK is another civic group that has played a central role in almost every social movement campaign pertaining to U.S.-ROK relations. In contrast to the moderate PSPD, SPARK is recognized as a
more radical group devoted to peace and reunification issues. Tracing its lineage to NL ideology, leaders of SPARK view U.S. military presence as a major obstacle to North-South reunification and have argued for the reduction, if not total withdrawal, of the U.S. military from the Korean Peninsula. SPARK activists oppose the U.S.-ROK alliance in the larger context of peace and reunification; rather than acting as a force for stability, U.S. military presence increases the level of militarization and insecurity on the peninsula and the region. This view has led SPARK to take a leading role in anti-U.S.-base movements, the U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) revision campaigns, the movement to block the purchase of F-15 fighter jets, and anti-Iraq war protests. SPARK leaders are also affiliated with progressive Catholic and Protestant religious organizations and act as a bridge between peace and religious groups.

Environmental and labor organizations have also played a significant role mobilizing South Koreans on issues pertaining to U.S.-ROK relations. Although internal strife since the mid-2000s has significantly weakened South Korean labor unions, the more progressive KCTU has provided warm bodies for protests directed against U.S. military presence and U.S.-ROK trade relations. Among environmental NGOs, Green Korea United and, to a lesser extent, the more moderate and institutionalized KFEM, has been at the forefront of environmental issues on U.S. bases. For instance, during the SOFA revision movement, GKU and other NGO representatives met with officials in the Ministry of Environment involved in the SOFA negotiations to persuade the ROK government to add an environmental clause to SOFA. Activists and sympathetic ROK National Assembly members also organized panel discussions inviting Ministry of Environment officials, the media, and other environmental experts. Such tactics resulted in the inclusion of a Memorandum of Special Understandings on Environmental Protection in the 2001 revised SOFA. Activists also pressed U.S. and South Korean officials to impose higher standards for base clean-up, particularly regarding Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, as a part of United States Forces Korea’s (USFK) base closure and realignment.

University students regularly participate in anti-U.S. protests, although student movements have also faced a significant decline since the mid-2000s. Rather than mobilize through a centralized national student union such as Hangchonryun as in the past, students today are more likely to participate through their own respective student organizations or clubs organized around academic departments or issue-based “circles” (e.g., environmental, peace and justice, community-service clubs).

In addition to large civic organizations, small nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations have shaped South Korean progressive discourse on U.S.-ROK relations. With only a full-time staff of one or two individuals and a few interns, NGOs such as Peace Network and the National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea provide detailed research on U.S. military–related issues including weapons sales, ROK defense spending, base-relocation projects, and crimes committed by U.S. soldiers. These smaller NGOs also disseminate their information to the media and participate in academic and policy forums. Other groups such as Peace Wind operate under the radar and help organize local residents and activists with larger national civic organizations.

Conservative civil-societal groups have been more sporadic, only playing a significant role in South Korea’s public sphere since 2004. Led by groups such as New Right Union and Liberty Union, the New Right movement emerged after Roh Moo-hyun captured the Blue House in the 2002 elections. However, momentum for the New Right significantly waned once the conservative Lee Myung-bak was elected president in 2008. Conservative movements, which were always more oriented toward a domestic agenda, weakened even further as President Lee’s approval ratings sput-
tered. Members of the New Right come from various sectors, with South Korean Christians taking lead roles. Some members of the New Right were activists from the democratization era but have since shifted their political orientation from progressive to conservative.

On U.S.-ROK–related issues, veterans and church groups have regularly appeared at pro-U.S. protests countering anti-American activists and signaling support for the alliance. For instance, responding to growing anti-Americanism in late 2002, approximately thirty thousand citizens, mostly organized by churches and conservative Christian organizations, held a rally near Seoul City Hall to express their gratitude to the United States and denounce “pro-North” activists. North Korean human rights and defector groups have also demonstrated support for the U.S.-ROK alliance, although their actions at times have indirectly complicated U.S. policy toward North Korea.

In sum, South Korean civil society is often treated as a singular group, but in reality it comprises a diverse set of actors with different networks, factions, and alliances. Civil-societal networks are loosely organized by political orientation and issue areas. With the rise of conservative movements and internal struggles within specific sectors, civil society appears more fragmented relative to previous decades. Fragmentation, coupled with policies strengthening state powers under two consecutive conservative governments, has lessened the direct impact of civil society in recent years.

AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND U.S.-ROK-RELATED ISSUES

Political scientists have recently commented on civil society’s limited impact against a strong state. South Korean scholar Choi Jang-jip argues, “Due to its well-developed bureaucratic-administrative system, the post- [democratic] transition state has been able to maintain a strong and overextended influence over society.”

Political scientist Jennifer Oh notes that the lack of mediating institutions—in particular, the absence of strong political parties or interest groups providing civil-societal actors access to policymakers—makes civil society relatively ineffective. Despite limitations at the immediate policy level, however, a handful of South Korean scholars contend that civil society has helped transform South Korean politics at a much broader level, aiding South Korea through the democratic consolidation process.

An evaluation of civil society’s impact on U.S-ROK issues suggests neither view is completely correct or incorrect. In general, the South Korean state wields enormous power over civil society on a wide range of issues, but especially on issues of foreign policy and national security. A strong consensus supporting the U.S.-ROK alliance continues to exist within the South Korean foreign policy and security establishment. Nevertheless, civil-societal actors have wielded some influence on alliance-related policies. Additionally, civic groups and NGOs have opened larger public debate on foreign policy issues with implications for U.S.-ROK relations. This was attested by mass demonstrations related to U.S. military presence throughout the early 2000s, which prompted Seoul and Washington to examine the future direction of U.S.-ROK relations and expedite the process of alliance transformation. Table 2 provides a chronology of major coalition movement campaigns directly related to U.S.-ROK relations and highlights the magnitude of each campaign.
Table 2. Major Coalition Movement Campaigns Related To U.S.-ROK Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coalition Movement Issues</th>
<th>Peak Protest Magnitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999–2001</td>
<td>Revise SOFA</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Close USFK Kooni Firing Range</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002–03</td>
<td>Revise SOFA/Justice for Death of Two Schoolgirls in USFK Accident</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Pro-USFK protests to stop troop reduction/anti-North Korea</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2007</td>
<td>Stop USFK Base Expansion/Relocation</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>KORUS Free Trade Agreement</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>U.S. Beef Export Ban</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Anti-North Korea</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>KORUS Free Trade Agreement</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various news sources.

As Table 2 depicts, civic groups have launched campaigns related to U.S. military presence in the past. These protests have influenced specific policy outcomes. For example, major demonstrations erupted in the spring and summer of 2000, when civic groups demanded the closure of a bombing and firing range off the coast of Maehyang-ri used by the U.S. Air Force. Constant disruption of training by activists resulted in USFK agreeing to suspend the use of live ammunition. The reduced effectiveness of the range eventually led USFK to shut down Kooni range in 2005 and relocate training exercises to other facilities.

Protests in Maehyang-ri coincided with the campaign, People’s Action to Reform an Unjust SOFA (PAR-SOFA). Although it was the ROK government, not civil society that initiated SOFA revision negotiations, sustained protests from civil society to revise SOFA provided South Korean diplomats additional leverage during negotiations. In addition to USFK-related issues, civil society has also mobilized against U.S. military sales and weapons procurement; most notably sales of the F-15 fighter jet in 2002 and 2003. While civic groups have not appeared to directly affect U.S. military sales, they have helped shape debates in the National Assembly on lowering defense expenditures in the ROK budget.

Bilateral trade is another issue in which civil society has played a highly visible role as captured by various movements surrounding the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Professional groups, industry associations, civic groups, and NGOs sustained high levels of mobilization prior to and throughout the 2006–2007 negotiation. Such demonstrations signaled to Korean and U.S. negotiators the extent of domestic opposition to the FTA, particularly from South Korean agriculture. Meanwhile, South Korean business organizations and trade associations, while not included in the category of civil society in this essay, responded with their own campaign supporting the FTA.

Civil-societal involvement on North/South issues has also influenced U.S. policy indirectly. Progressive peace groups tend to support efforts to reach out to North Korea, encouraging the South Korean government to seek rapprochement with Pyongyang. These civil-societal actors have followed a relatively consistent position on North Korea since the 1980s, and, as argued earlier, see U.S.
military presence as an impediment to improved inter-Korean relations. Conversely, conservative
groups, most notably South Korean veterans and more recently North Korean defector groups and
human rights organizations, periodically stage anti-North Korean protests. For example, around one
thousand protestors gathered in downtown Seoul burning North Korean flags and effigies of Kim
Jong Il following North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. While not directly
affecting U.S policies toward North Korea, human rights organizations such as the Citizens’ Alliance
for North Korean Human Rights, as part of a larger transnational campaign, have joined forces with
organizations in the United States to promote North Korean issues such as the North Korean Hu-
man Rights Act of 2004 passed in the U.S. Congress. Transnational links between civil society in
South Korea and the United States also helped push Congress to pass a bill in January 2007 calling
on the Japanese government to “formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibil-
ity” for coercing women into sexual slavery.

CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

A review of different civil-societal movements related to U.S.-ROK issues suggests their impact is
limited on issues related to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Nevertheless, this broad overview does shed light
on important trends associated with South Korean civil society and potential methods to measure the
impact of social movement activism on U.S.-ROK–related issues.

First, civil-societal organizations operate as a network that potentially affects policymaking. Net-
works may center on different sectors: labor, agriculture, peace, human rights, and the environment,
to name a few. Networks may also exist across the left-right political spectrum. In the Korean con-
text, almost every social movement targeting U.S.-ROK–related issues has resulted in the formation
of a broad coalition campaign involving overlapping networks. Through these networks, civil-
societal actors exchange information, pool resources, share movement tactics, and build solidarity.
Civil-societal networks are not insular: When mobilized around powerful frames, they extend to the
broader public either by direct people-to-people contact, or indirectly through traditional and social
media. Network ties are also built to a lesser extent with sympathetic politicians and policymakers.
To the extent that network ties are measureable, mapping the size, growth rate, cohesiveness, and
centrality of a particular social-movement network may indicate the potential strength of civil socie-
tal pressure (or support) on a particular policy.\textsuperscript{26}

Second, large protests attract media attention, which in turn places indirect pressure on govern-
ment actors to address civil-societal demands. Although clashes with riot police may backfire by
drawing negative attention to activists as witnessed during anti-base movements in Pyeongtaek in
2006, they can also put the spotlight on issues that otherwise would have remained unknown to the
general public. As one South Korean environmental activist noted, the hazards of live-ammunition
training at Kooni Firing Range in Maehyang-ri would have been a nonissue had it not been for the
broad coalition formed between local and national activists and the attention drawn to Maehyang-ri
from major Korean news outlets. After making concessions to activists, including the suspension of
live-ammunition training, USFK eventually shut down Kooni Range in 2005.

Third, South Korean civil society may influence the direction of bilateral negotiations. Negotiators
confront a “two-level game” and must present a position that not only satisfies their bilateral partner
at the international level, but also gains support from domestic actors who have the power to veto
any agreement. In some instances, civil-societal demands may provide South Korean negotiators ad-
ditional leverage against their U.S. counterparts if policymakers and activists hold similar positions. During SOFA negotiations in 2000, South Korean policymakers were able to strengthen their position in pushing for a series of revisions including new labor standards, tax requirements, and criminal jurisdiction involving serious crimes. Of course, if protests grow out of hand, civil society may also complicate the government’s position as the state must manage both domestic forces and international obligations.

Two areas in which civil society could potentially play a greater role in U.S.-ROK relations in the near future are the current negotiations regarding U.S.-South Korea nuclear-energy cooperation and U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relations. On civil nuclear cooperation, beyond expertise provided by academics and think tanks, civil society as a whole has largely remained outside of the nuclear-cooperation debate. However, in future rounds, it is conceivable that both progressive and conservative groups weigh in on the merits or hazards of granting South Korea greater latitude in managing its own nuclear capabilities and technology. Conservative groups, promoting a nationalist agenda, could align with business groups interested in promoting South Korea’s growing nuclear sector. Progressive civic groups, and especially peace activists concerned about nuclear safety and proliferation, may work to prevent any expansion of nuclear energy on the peninsula. Such a position has already been adopted by peace activists in Japan who remain leery of expanded nuclear energy programs.

To the extent that South Korean civic groups remain involved in protests related to Japan’s wartime past and ongoing territorial disputes over the small islets known as Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan, civil society also carries an impact on U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateralism. Tensions in ROK-Japan relations at the societal level percolate to the policy level as witnessed by the cancellation of the Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in July 2012. Although ROK politicians cried foul on Lee Myung-bak’s closed-door deal with Japan to enhance intelligence cooperation, the more dramatic show of anti-Japanese sentiment from civil-societal groups (e.g., erecting a statue of a comfort girl in front of the Japanese Embassy, throwing eggs at photos of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) continue to sustain negative attitudes toward Japan while drawing strong reactions from Japanese right-wing groups. Although two-thirds of Koreans in a February 2013 poll claimed a GSOMIA with Japan is needed, the attention drawn by anti-Japan protests in the South Korean and international media leaves the impression that South Korea remains resistant to closer ROK-Japan relations. Consequently, U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral cooperation will remain difficult without broader support from both politicians and civil-societal actors in South Korea and Japan.

Unlike the authoritarian period, the growth of civil society in the democratic era has meant U.S. and South Korean policymakers must now contend with a third actor when deliberating on alliance policy issues. Civil society provides additional policy-relevant information to policymakers and the broader public, acting as a watchdog toward the government and channeling the voice of ordinary and at times marginalized citizens to the public sphere. Although civil-societal participation has produced alliance friction in the short-term before, it has also helped push U.S.-ROK relations toward a more equal partnership centered on democratic principles. To this end, ROK civil society has contributed to the overall development of post-Cold War U.S.-ROK relations.
About the Author

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3. The concept of civil society in this essay is taken as “sustained, organized, social activity that occurs in groups that are formed outside the state, the market, and the family.” See Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr, *The State of Civil Society in Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. iii. Civil-societal groups are largely voluntary and self-organized, operating within the public sphere and acting autonomously from the state.
7. Cumings, p. 23; Lee, p. 46.
10. Shin and Chang, p. 5.
11. By permitting the Chun regime to dispatch the military to Gwangju, young Koreans believed the United States had given the regime tacit approval to put down protests in Gwangju by force. Most Korean scholars mark the Gwangju Uprising as the beginning of anti-American movements in South Korea.
14. Many smaller NGOs disappear or merge with other organizations after a few years, making it difficult to track the entire population of civic groups and NGOs relevant to U.S.-ROK issues over a longer time period.
15. Several organizations such as Minbyun and KCTU previously existed under a different name and/or had roots in movements and organizations that existed prior to South Korea’s democratic transition.
16. In addition to full-time staff, citizens’ organizations have formal members and collect membership dues.
17. This figure, posted on KCTU's Korean website, may not be up-to-date.
20. Peace Wind is led by Father Mun Junghyeon, a long-time spiritual leader to anti-U.S. campaigns.
24. Peak protest magnitude reports the largest single recorded turn out throughout an entire movement episode. I used figures provided from police estimates when available in news reports. Data compiled from various news media sources via Lexis Nexus.


27. Based on conflicting historical and legal interpretations, South Korea and Japan both claim sovereignty over this small group of islets.