International Relations of an Islamist Movement: The Case of the Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan

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Foreword

Understanding and dealing with Islamic fundamentalism has been one of the more difficult foreign policy challenges for the United States in the last decade. Few policymakers seem to comprehend the ideology behind so-called fundamentalist groups, or the rationales behind their actions. While some analysts call it the successor to the Red Scare and have dubbed it the Green Menace, others contend that these groups are essentially social movements with a religious emphasis. Whichever view is correct, there is broad agreement that the topic of Islamic fundamentalism requires further attention, and the papers from the Muslim Politics Project hope to address this issue.

The goal of the Muslim Politics Project, which began in 1994, was to counter the misperceptions that prevail in influential circles and to present Islamic intellectual and political agendas in all their complexity and diversity. One of its several undertakings was to commission papers on Islamist foreign policy in order to better understand the international political attitudes and policies of various Islamist groups. This resulted in papers on the following movements: Jama’at-i Islami in Pakistan, Hamas, Hizballah, the Taliban, the Central Asian Islamic Renaissance Party, as well as an analysis of U.S. policy toward Islamism. Each of these papers goes into detail not only about the movements themselves, but how it affects U.S. foreign policy. We believe that they provide insights on a topic that challenges policymakers and will help prevent future misunderstandings.

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There is much written about the impact of Islamist forces on international politics. Comparatively little is known about how Islamist forces conceive of the international arena, understand their interests therein, and formulate policies to serve those interests. It is the aim of this paper to elucidate Islamist thinking on international affairs by exploring the directives that are inherent to the Islamist ideological discourse, as well as the imperatives that confront Islamism in the political arena, by examining the case of the Jama'at-i Islami (Islamic Party) of Pakistan.

The Legacy of Pan-Islamism
Islamist thinking about international issues begins with the vision of the larger Muslim world. Islamism since the time of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), the forerunner of modern Islamist activism and a prime advocate of Islamic unity, has possessed an international, pan-Islamic dimension.1 Revivalists have aspired, in varying degrees, to give meaning to the Islamic notion of *umma* (holy or virtuous community), and even to reconstitute the caliphate as a transnational institution of authority. Such efforts as the Khilafat (caliphate) movement in India from 1919-19212 or the Muslim congresses that convened in the Middle East after World War I have sought to put into practice the universalist claims of revivalism.3 The symbolism of the *umma* and the caliphate have since been used by activists to construct an ideal
vision of sociopolitical change and to gain legitimacy and strength in politics. The central role that the desire for unity plays in Muslim politics has led some observers to view Islam and those who advocate its participation in politics as fundamentally at odds with both the spirit and reality of the nation-state system. Such characterizations are not supported by empirical evidence. Islamic universalism has been kept at bay by the reality of the nation-state. The rhetoric of universalism withstanding, Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Jama'at-i Islami, have divided up along national lines and developed as national political organizations. In the same vein, the Islamic Republic of Iran has failed to break out of its Iranian mold, and over time its foreign policy has been decided by national interest; still, based on the rhetoric of Muslim groups and especially of Islamist movements and parties, many continue to view revivalists as internationalists bent on overrunning national boundaries in their attempts to construct an “Islamdom.”

Constructing an image of Islamist forces based on a face-value reading of their rhetoric, however, tends to obfuscate more than it reveals about the nature of their politics and attitudes about international issues. First, it is not possible to discern a singular Islamist attitude toward international politics, or pan-Islamism and its constituent symbols, for that matter. The prevalent use of terms such as umma or caliphate in the revivalist literature may lead observers to conclude that these terms mean the same things they did in classical texts, or that they are interpreted uniformly among different movements. In fact, Islamist forces are often at loggerheads as to the exact meaning of such foundational concepts. In this regard, Islamists are not very different from other ideological movements, particularly communism, that have preceded them.

Second, a face-value reading of the earlier revivalist and the more recent Islamist rhetoric tends to make ideology the dominant criterion in discerning attitudes toward international issues, which may be misleading. Like all political forces, Islamic groups and parties are motivated by the imperatives and constraints that confront them in the political arena.
Third, universalist rhetoric may serve different purposes for different political forces. For instance, it is debatable if, during the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republic of Iran was motivated by Islamic universalism or Iranian nationalism. The interlinkage between ideological posturing and nationalist aims is not very different from what was witnessed in other ideological states or movements, as during the heyday of Arab nationalism or in the post-Stalinist era of communism.

Finally, looking solely at what activists say diverts attention from the manner in which states knowingly or inadvertently shape the international attitudes of the Islamist groups. That is, the approaches of Islamists to foreign policy and international concerns are only partly conditioned by ideology and cannot be satisfactorily explained except by examining state policy and the regional and international context in which ideological directives are implemented. There is a great deal more complexity and nuance involved here than a simple reading of Islamist rhetoric would lead one to believe.

The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan provides a valuable case study for examining the issues raised above. This paper will use the case of the Jama’at to address a number of specific concerns about what Islamists demand in terms of foreign policy, how they conceive of the international system, and how their engagement in international issues has changed—or can change—their ideological outlooks and political programs.

First formed in British India in 1941 by Sayyid Abul ‘Ala Mawdudi (1903—79), the Jama’at split into independent Pakistani and Indian units following the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. In 1971, a Bangladeshi unit was formed, and since then Jama’at-i Islami parties or affiliations have also formed in Sri Lanka, western Europe, and North America, the latter two still embryonic in form. In Pakistan the Jama’at has operated as a national party since 1947, playing a central role in the direction of state formation and the unfolding of key political events in Pakistan’s history. The interaction of the Jama’at’s worldview and its pragmatic reactions to the imperatives of foreign policymaking, which will be detailed in the following pages, have
shaped the party’s outlook on international politics in general, as well as its particular role in Pakistani politics.

MAWDUDI’S IDEOLOGY AND THE CONTOURS OF THE JAMA ‘AT’S FOREIGN POLICY

The Legacy of British Rule in India

Although foreign policy was not a constituent part of the Jama‘at’s initial program, the party’s agenda was premised from the outset on a particular view of international affairs shaped at the time of India’s struggle for independence. Thus the party was clearly aware of the structure of global relations, in which the imperial powers reigned supreme and colonial populations were not afforded sovereignty or status commensurate with that enjoyed by Western powers. The consciousness of imperialism, however, did not translate into the kind of nationalism that Jawaherlal Nehru or Mahatma Gandhi advocated. It gave shape instead to the tendency that had characterized Indian Muslims since the advent of the British order—namely, the desire to construct a normative order that would allow them to live according to their own standards and ideals. The notion of a discrete Islamic system that would preserve Muslim faith and cultural life and limit Western penetration of Muslim India was first floated by the influential ‘ulama (religious authorities) of the Deoband school, who since mid-nineteenth century had dominated the religious scene in north India. By the turn of the century, the desire for autonomy had become institutionalized in Muslim religious and political discourse and had begun to shape the political outlook of the Indian Muslim community.

The concept of a distinct normative order was not only functionally desirable but also of great symbolic importance as it harkened to the Islamic ideal of the umma. Within it, there was the impetus to purify as well as preserve orthopraxy in observance of the faith. This made unity, and the ideals, institutions, and even sites that conjure it, central to Indian Muslim politics. In the nineteenth century, Indian Muslims had forced the British
to defend holy shrines in the Hijaz from destruction at the hands of Wahhabis. At the turn of the century, Muslims in the city of Hyderabad mobilized financial resources to help Medina (the second most holy city of Islam) during a time of financial hardship.12 The sense of closeness with the heartlands of Islam was also fostered by historical legacies and institutional contacts. The Asifiyah dynasty of Hyderabad, whose nizams (hereditary rulers of Hyderabad before 1947) ruled over the largest princely state in British India, traced their lineage to the Ottomans, just as several Shiite nawabs (Muslim princes in India) and noblemen of northern India traced their ancestry to sayyid (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) families of Iran and Iraq. The claims of shrines and institutions from Uch Sharif in southern Punjab to the Jama’ mosque of Delhi to hold symbolic relics, such as Qurans ostensibly inscribed by ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (the son-in-law of the prophet and the fourth caliph), strands of hair from the prophet’s beard, or footprints of ‘Ali, attest to the preoccupation of Indian Muslims with the unity of the larger Islamic world and its importance to political power and legitimacy.

Institutional contacts between the ‘ulama and the centers of learning in Iran and Iraq (for Shiites), and Sunni madrassas (religious schools) in the Arabian peninsula and al-Azhar in Egypt, reinforced this tendency. Until recently, the majority of Shiite ‘ulama of the subcontinent were students of Ayatollah Abu’l-Qasim Khu’i of Najaf in Iraq; today there are more than 6,000 Pakistani seminary students in Qum, Iran. Institutional contacts between South Asian Shiism and the faith’s centers of learning in Iraq and Iran remain strong.

During the tumultuous decades that led to the partition of the Indian subcontinent, politics and ideological posturing became increasingly anchored in discussions about the nature and desirability of reconstituting an umma to preserve and promote Muslim piety and cultural independence. The apprehension with which some Muslims viewed the program of the Congress Party and its conception of secular and composite nationalism converted the notion of an ideal umma—as a separate normative order—into a surrogate for nationalism. As a result, political
mobilization increasingly invoked symbols of Muslim unity. The Khilafat movement that marked the beginning of open Muslim political activism in the context of the independence movement was the best example of this trend. Ironically, it was launched in defense of an Islamic institution that symbolized the unity of the Muslim world, and yet the fate of the caliphate lay in the hands of the newly installed Turkish republic.

The religious and political vision of Jama’at-i Islami’s chief ideologue and long time leader, Mawlana Mawdudi, was shaped within this context. From early on he revealed a deep concern with the notion of the umma. This concern surfaces in his writing at two points: when discussing the creation of a pure Islamic order at the local level, and when envisioning a universal Islamic order. Both developments are predicated on the creation of true ummas. To understand Mawdudi’s international vision, it is important to discern how his conceptions of the universal and local umma interact, and when and how they separate. Since the Jama’at’s foreign policy is rooted in these conceptions, the conflicts and contradictions inherent in Mawdudi’s thinking are also those which have riddled the Jama’at’s foreign policy.

Early on, the notion of a universal umma appears to have been more important to Mawdudi than that of a local one. During his initiation into politics in the context of the Indian nationalist movement, even before he embarked on an activist agenda, he was impressed by pan-Islamism and its ideal of the universal umma. In 1921, Mawdudi joined the Tahrik-i Hijrat (Migration Movement) to protest British rule over India. The Tahrik was premised on the notion that since India was no longer part of dar al-Islam (land of Islam), all Indian Muslims should emigrate to Afghanistan, where Islam continued to reign. The traditional Islamic division of the world into dar al-Islam and dar al-harb (abode of war), which undergirded the Tahrik’s logic, framed the problem of British imperialism not as one of foreign rule over India, but as one of non-Muslim rule over Muslims—a problem not limited to one geographical territory or nation but involving all Muslims alike. Imperialism could not, therefore, be overcome by nationalism but through
the creation and preservation of an Islamic umma. In this case, sustaining an Islamic normative order in India was not enough; Muslims needed to move physically beyond the purview of British authority.

Interestingly, this approach was to surface in Mawdudi’s thinking in later years. In 1951, for instance, he caused a major religious dispute in Pakistan by declaring that India was dar al-kufr (land of unbelief), and that Pakistanis were forbidden to marry anyone from India and to accept any inheritances from there. Indian and Pakistani ’ulama did not share Mawdudi’s views and strongly objected to his declaration. Traces of a vision of the world divided into an Islamic umma and non-Muslim dar al-harb would periodically continue to surface in Mawdudi’s works.

The Impact of the Khilafat Movement
Similar considerations governed Mawdudi’s understanding of the aim and political function of the Khilafat movement. For him the caliphate stood not only as the symbol of Muslim unity but as a sacrosanct institution that would preserve that unity and give shape to a transnational umma whose borders would encompass all Muslim territories. The Khilafat movement was thus simultaneously a struggle against Western imperialism (which he viewed as the principal obstacle to Muslim unity) and an affirmation of the centrality of the umma as an ideal as well as a reality for Muslim life.

The abolition of the caliphate by the new Turkish republic in 1924 ended the Khilafat movement in India, with major implications for Mawdudi’s thinking. He was greatly perturbed by Arab hostility to Ottoman rule, and more important, by the cavalier fashion in which Turkey had discarded the caliphate. In both cases he believed nationalists in collusion with Europeans had betrayed Islam. It was then that Mawdudi developed his deep-seeded suspicion of nationalism, which he came to view as a surreptitious form of Western domination and the foremost threat to the realization of the umma.

Despite his open hostility to nationalism, Mawdudi became cognizant of its seeming inevitability. The end of the caliphate
had proved that nationalism, for better or worse, was a force whose grip on the Muslim imagination was only likely to grow. Moreover, with the caliphate out of the picture, the *umma* was unlikely to materialize as a territorial reality. However, it was likely to shape how Muslims might imagine or idealize their relations to “others” in the international arena. From that point on, Mawdudi tacitly accepted nationalism in the framework of his idealization of the *umma*. He would seek to address and accommodate both, sometimes conceding the reality of the nation-state system and other times asserting the inevitable ascendance of the *umma*. Consequently, without a clear-cut directive regarding the primacy of the nation or *umma*, Mawdudi’s thinking on international issues is uncertain and ambiguous.

*The Legacy of Communalism and Muslim Separatism*
In broad brush, there were two Muslim positions in India during the interwar period. First, there were those Muslim intellectual and political leaders who supported the Congress Party, actively participated in its politics, and encouraged their fellow Muslims to do the same. They were fiercely anti-imperialist and viewed opposition to the British to be the foremost concern of their community. Second, there were those Muslim leaders, exemplified and later led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (d.1948) in the Muslim League, who did not view the struggle against the British to be the paramount concern of the Muslims and remained apprehensive about living as a minority in a predominantly Hindu India. They believed that Muslims were best advised to reassess their commitment to the Congress Party and to focus on safeguarding and furthering their communal interests before an uncertain future. Mawdudi articulated his views amid the lively and bitter debate between Jinnah and the Muslim supporters of the Congress Party. Some of Mawdudi’s most lucid expositions on the relation between religion, society, and politics were recorded in books on Muslim politics of the time, with such titles as *Muslims and the Current Political Struggle* (Musulman awr mawjudah siyasi kashmakash) or *Question of Nationality* (Mas’alah-i qaumiyat).
As discussed above, Mawdudi was not in favor of secular nationalism; however, this did not mean that he was oblivious to nationalist sentiments and arguments or uninfluenced by the nationalist paradigm. Contrary to popular assertion, he was not opposed to Pakistan, but he objected to Jinnah and the Muslim League’s conception of it. Much like Jinnah, Mawdudi viewed the activities of the Congress Party with apprehension. He was not convinced of the sagacity of vesting Muslim interests in the fortunes of the struggle for independence, and he strongly criticized the “blind” anti-imperialism that had led many Muslims into the fold of the Congress Party. For Mawdudi, anti-imperialism would only make sense in an Islamic milieu.

Mawdudi also firmly opposed the suggestion that the Congress Party represented Muslim interests, or that it could do so in a future Indian republic. He was particularly sensitive to any suggestion that it was religiously incumbent on Muslims to support the Congress Party in its struggle to free India from the clutches of British rule. This soon led Mawdudi into a heated debate with senior Indian ‘ulama who supported the Congress Party and who were bent on using Islam to mobilize support for the independence movement. When the renowned Indian Islamic leader and the head of the eminent Jamia’at-i ‘ulama-i Hind (Society of Indian ‘ulama), Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (d.1957), wrote Islam and Composite Nationalism (Islam awr mutahhadh qaumiyat), depicting a multicomunal Indian state that would be compatible with the teachings of Islam, Mawdudi reacted strongly, attacking Madani in public speeches and in a number of tracks.20

Madani’s book, along with the Congress Party’s direct appeal to Muslims through such measures as the “mass contact movement,” which was directed at taking the Congress Party’s message to the Muslim masses and recruiting larger numbers of Muslims into the party, convinced Mawdudi that the first order of business was to close off the Muslim community to the Congress Party. He articulated an Islamist ideology from that point on in order to preclude the possibility of a “composite nationalism.” Islamism for Mawdudi was the assertion of the Muslim
community’s prerogative to determine the limits of individual moral behavior and define the nature of a Muslim’s relation to Islam; But more important and as a result, it was the means to create impregnable walls around the Muslim community. By interpreting Islam as an ideology for a vigilant community that emphasized puritanism, the exoteric dimensions of the faith, and strict obedience to Islamic law, and by discouraging those customs and rituals that resembled Hindu practices or could serve as a bridge to Hinduism, Mawdudi moved to change the cultural milieu of Indian Islam as well as the context in which Muslims were encountering the political choices before them. As the balance of relations between Muslims and Hindus would change at the national level and in neighborhoods, towns, and villages, “composite nationalism” would cease to be a viable option. In the process, the resurgence of Islamic sentiments, as interpreted by Mawdudi, would lay the foundations for organization building and political activism. Mawdudi’s conception of the revival and reform of Islam, therefore, was at its inception tantamount to radical communalism.

Mawdudi’s vision was not antistate or anti-imperialist per se—at least not at first—but it aimed at stymieing the progress of the Congress Party and the political ascendancy of the Hindu community. Those whom it viewed as “traitors” to the cause of Islam were not only secular or modernist Muslims but were the spokesmen of orthodoxy—the ‘ulama. “Treason” here was not to the faith, but to the communal interests of Muslims. Nor was Mawdudi’s conception of Islam driven by the yearning for an improbable utopia; it had a clear aim and a definite functional use.

The Jama’at-i Islami was founded on the idea of the umma as an unadulterated and exclusive embodiment of the vision of Islam that would preclude cultural coexistence with Hindus. The party would serve as a vehicle for propagating this vision, and hence control Muslim politics of the time. Echoes of this original intent are clearly reflected in the subsequent development of Mawdudi’s discourse. The communalist directive couched in universalist rhetoric—whereby the quest for umma serves to define a community separate from Indian society in na-
tional terms rather than purely theological ones—made Mawdudi’s ideology ineluctably tied to questions of nationhood, separatism, sovereignty, territorial borders, and how these may be related to “Muslimness.”

Still, the ideal of the umma was significant in itself. No sooner had the Jama’at formed than Mawdudi established a bureau charged with translating his works into Arabic. Persian and Turkish translations soon followed. Clearly, Mawdudi felt a unity of purpose with Arab, Persian, and Turkish Muslims and viewed the Jama’at’s activities and his own ideas as relevant to their lives and causes. This universalist outlook was instilled in the Jama’at and became part of its mission. In time, the translation efforts entrenched the universalist image of the party as they promoted Mawdudi as an international Islamic thinker whose ideas have been instrumental in shaping Islamism across the Muslim world.

The interplay of universalism and nationalism, as mentioned above, made Mawdudi’s position on international affairs quite complex and at times obfuscated its direction. At the utopian level, Mawdudi’s ideology was pan-Islamic in tone and intent, committed to the universalism of the umma. In practice, however, it operated in the communalist and nationalist milieu from which Mawdudi’s political vision drew inspiration, and in which his organization and program of action took shape. This is evident in Mawdudi’s suggestions in 1938 that India become a “two-nation” federation consisting of 14 Muslim territories and a single Hindu one, “tied together only for defense, communications and trade.” This “state within a state” (riyasat dar riyasat), as Mawdudi called it, was a fusion of the conception of Indian Muslims as an umma with a nation-state concept of India.

With time, Mawdudi would become even more accommodating of the reality of nationhood and a world order based on nation-states. When India was partitioned in 1947, the Jama’at-i Islami was also divided into separate Pakistani and Indian (and Kashmiri) units, sharing Mawdudi’s ideology but working through independent organizational structures defined in terms of the national polity in which they operated. Mawdudi justified this move by arguing that each organization would face different
political realities under separate national circumstances and could not be caught in the middle of conflicts between Pakistan and India. By giving up his leadership of the Indian Jama’at-i Islami and breaking the embryonic umma along national lines, Mawdudi effectively surrendered the ideal of the umma to the reality of the developing nation-state order in the region. In later years, new Jama’at-i Islamis would emerge in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, again independent of one another and of the Indian and Pakistani units.

The Search for a Space Between Socialism and Capitalism
Western ideologies were important influences on Mawdudi’s thinking on international affairs. Mawdudi was always keen to compare Islam with socialism and capitalism rather than with Christianity, attesting not only to the fact that he saw Islam as a sociopolitical system and an ideology, but that he was preoccupied by Western political and institutional values and ideals.

Mawdudi’s discourse, much like that of other Islamist thinkers, displays distrust and hostility toward the West. Mawdudi viewed the West as an evil force determined to destroy Islam and subjugate Muslims politically and culturally. As a result, Mawdudi was eager not only to empower Muslims politically but to safeguard their cultural autonomy. Anti-Westernism largely defined Mawdudi’s understanding of modern international relations; nevertheless, his stance on the relations between Islam and the West was also informed by more nuanced thinking.

First of all, Mawdudi’s opposition to the West was conditioned by his communalist inclination. Mawdudi typified the North Indian Muslim noble who, disenfranchised by the British, blamed colonial rule for the marginalization of Indian Muslims and the ascendancy of Hindus. Still, his primary concern was not with imperialism but with containing Hindu power. Anti-Westernism was therefore important to Mawdudi, but it was not the animating force of his activism. He responded to conflicts in the Indian social context, and he then gave them meaning in the more general framework of relations between Islam and the West.
The greater relevance of the West to Mawdudi’s discourse lies in his belief that Western values had weakened and would continue to weaken Muslims, and conversely, that Muslims might gain power and subdue Hindus only if they returned to the pristine teachings of their faith—a task that would begin with purifying their lives of Western influences. More immediately, his critique of the West was concerned with asserting social control over Muslims and denying the possibility of control to the Congress Party. The political ideology of Indian nationalism was Western in orientation; it drew on Western ideals of nationhood and democracy. By rejecting these ideals as alien to Islam, Mawdudi in effect sought to close the Muslim community to the appeal of the Congress Party’s message. Although the anti-Western posture became institutionalized in Mawdudi’s ideology, the fact that its use was tied to communitarian objectives greatly complicated the role that it would play in the Jama‘at-i Islami’s policies in the following years.

Although he was anti-Western, Mawdudi’s dismissal of the West was no mere “blanket rejection.” In fact, he was quite concerned with the details of Western ideas and political institutions, and he distinguished between the “evils” of capitalism and of socialism. Beyond his general condemnations, one finds more complex analyses of the West and, by implication, international affairs.

Mawdudi was critical of what he understood capitalism’s and socialism’s positions to be on individual rights and needs. He saw capitalism and socialism as lacking ethical values—they were secular worldviews unable to address social and individual concerns satisfactorily. He argued that only Islam is based on an ethical perspective that can strike a tenable balance between the good of society as a whole and the interests of the individual. Mawdudi therefore viewed Islam as an alternative to both capitalism and socialism, embodying all the virtues of the two systems and none of their shortcomings. This was a “Third Worldist” conception of sorts, but despite its aspiration to rise above the two poles of capitalism and socialism, it never fully eluded their magnetic pull.

In practice, Mawdudi was more wary of socialism than of capitalism. This attitude was shaped by his reading of the poli-
tics of the princely state of Hyderabad, where he had grown up and where his family had been tied to the nizam’s court. Ever since the 1930s and the 1940s, when the communist movement in Telangana had seriously challenged the nizam’s regime, communism had become a major threat to the princely state. Mawdudi viewed the communists as allies of the Congress Party and instruments for dismantling Muslim rule and empowering the Hindu peasantry. In addition, Mawdudi’s attitudes toward socialism reflected the pro-Pakistan Muslims’ disdain for Jawaharlal Nehru, his socialist politics, and his views on the future of India. For these Muslims, socialism was closely associated with Nehru and Indian nationalism, and as such had to be resisted.

Mawdudi’s communalist outlook had prejudiced him against the left, which he viewed as anti-Muslim. This attitude would stay with him throughout his life and would keep the Jama’at-i Islami on the right, influencing the party’s foreign policy positions in the same manner. It is thus not surprising that the Jama’at assumed a leading role in supporting the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation in the 1980s.

Moreover, Mawdudi was not persuaded by Marxist arguments, and in economic matters he always remained conservative. He defended the sanctity of private property in Islam, even when it was politically costly. For example, Mawdudi opposed the Pakistani government’s attempts to introduce land reform throughout the 1950s for the reason that it violated Islam’s teachings on the right to property. Similarly, throughout the 1960s when the left gained strength by exploiting income inequality born of rapid industrialization and rural poverty, the Jama’at avoided populist formulas or challenges to the structure of economic relations.

The Role of Islamic and Islamist Concepts
Mawdudi’s international vision was also influenced by how he understood and interpreted key Islamic and Islamist concepts—the former being the tenets and teachings of the faith, and the latter pertaining to the specific interpretations and ideological formulations of contemporary Islamist movements. Mawdudi has been
responsible for the wide use and particular reading of many of these concepts, a few of which are especially relevant to the discussion here: jihad, the Islamic state (including discussions of Islamic economics), and minority and human rights.

JIHAD AND HOLY WAR

Islamists and the Western media use the term *jihad* indiscriminately: the former to legitimate political struggles in religious terms, and the latter to conjure images of blood, violence, and unrelenting intolerance and hate. In the process, a complex doctrinal with broad possibilities for interpretation has been reduced to a battlecry in the Islamists’ struggle against the West.

Mawdudi’s use of the term jihad does not fit the general context in which it is used by Islamists. In fact, Mawdudi consciously avoided invoking caricatures of *jihad*. He once argued that jihad must not represent “a crazed faith . . . Muslims with blood-shot eyes, shouting *Allahu akbar*, decapitating an unbeliever wherever they see one, cutting off heads while invoking *La ilaha illa-llah*.24 Although Mawdudi had been prone to viewing the world as *dar al-Islam* versus *dar al-harb*, his teachings on jihad do not reveal such a tendency. Rather, Mawdudi interpreted the doctrine in a nuanced manner that favored its use in politics in a limited and regulated fashion within the context of the nation-state system.

Mawdudi’s earliest work on jihad, *al-Jihad fi’l-Islam* (Jihad in Islam), published first in 1930, was written in response to attacks on the doctrine pursuant to the murder of an anti-Muslim Hindu revivalist preacher.25 Disturbed by the English-speaking media’s characterization of Islam as a religion of violence and the impact that such characterizations had on the morale of educated Muslims, Mawdudi decided to outline the meaning and conditions for the use of jihad. In this work, Mawdudi sought to show that jihad is a coherent doctrine of war governed by clear-cut procedural and juridical rules. In this regard it does not differ greatly from Western doctrines of war, defense of the realm, and the like. By juxtaposing jihad with Western doctrines
of war, Mawdudi moved to integrate a conception of Muslim political life into the international system and to use the norms of that system to rationalize and formalize jihad as a properly regulated doctrine of war. Far from harkening to pan-Islamic atavism or dusting off the doctrine to use it against the ruling establishment, Mawdudi used jihad as an instrument to modernize Islamic perspectives on international affairs.

The impact of this process became evident in a tussle over the use of jihad by Pakistan soon after it was created. In April 1948, the governments of India and Pakistan reached a ceasefire agreement in their conflict over Kashmir. Pakistan, however, continued surreptitiously to support “volunteer” freedom fighters. Given their status as “volunteers,” the guerrillas were not bound by the terms of the ceasefire, and the government could not be responsible for a campaign declared by nongovernmental actors. Mawdudi was not persuaded by this line of reasoning and strongly criticized Pakistan’s course of action. In a letter to one of Pakistan’s senior ‘ulama at the time, Mawdudi argued that regardless of the merits of the ceasefire agreement—to which he was actually opposed—its terms were binding on all Pakistani citizens after it had been signed by the government. In effect, he was reasoning that the nation-state of Pakistan was the only legitimate international actor, and nonstate actors could not conduct foreign policies of their own. Later he added that so long as the government of Pakistan was bound by the terms of its ceasefire agreement with India, it could not declare a jihad in Kashmir lest it violate the sharia’s injunction that a government abide by the terms of an agreement that it has signed. Since jihad had to be declared by a state, there was no possibility that any other source could declare one, and hence there could be no military campaign for the “volunteer” force-fighting in Kashmir. Mawdudi would have liked Pakistan to end its ceasefire and go to war with India, in which case it could declare jihad; barring that, it could neither declare jihad nor fight a covert war. The state viewed Mawdudi’s arguments as seditious and thus imprisoned him. It is important to note that it was the Pakistani Vali Nasr
state that was pushing for an undisciplined and militant use of jihad, not the country’s principal Islamist party.

In later years, however, the Jama’at would prove to be more open to the use of jihad and less emphatic on the rules and regulations that should govern its declaration. This development had less to do with ideology or militancy than with the realities of operating in the political process. Mawdudi’s 1948 decree on jihad in Kashmir had been unpopular. His principled stance then was viewed as unpatriotic, especially after the Kabul and Srinagar radios broadcast it widely as a *fatwa* (legal opinion). Moreover, although Mawdudi had been more hardline on Kashmir than the government—favoring a resumption of war with India—his arguments were lost on the public in the chorus of accusations that he was subverting the struggle in Kashmir. The Jama’at thenceforth became more cautious in engaging in hair-splitting debates over use of jihad, and more eager to be on the forefront of its invocation, especially in Kashmir. For instance, in 1999 the Jama’at strongly supported Pakistan’s decision to send militants into Kargil in Kashmir. The party staged a strongly antigovernment demonstration in Lahore in July 1999 to protest Pakistan’s decision to withdraw the militants. In 1999 the Jama’at’s position on conduct of jihad by nongovernment actors in Kashmir was a complete *volte face* from its policy in 1948.

In addition, the Afghan war has made jihad more central to political posturing of Islamist groups. It has been a watershed event that has deeply impressed the Jama’at’s—as well as other Islamist organizations’—thinking on jihad. During the Afghan war a new ideological and organizational model surfaced, which has since conditioned the development of the newer breed of Pakistani Islamists forces. This model is more strident in its revolutionary rhetoric and advocates military and guerilla organizational practices. A number of Islamist youth groups, for instance, have adopted this model, favoring declaring the state as un-Islamic and initiating an armed struggle against it.

The Afghan jihad was conceived of by the United States and Pakistan and received strong financial and moral support from Saudi Arabia. These patrons enlisted the help of the Jama’at,
and the party benefited financially and politically from the war and developed certain vested interest in its continuation. Still, the most important impact of the war was ideological. It led the Jama’at to place too much importance on Islamic symbolism as a force to mobilize an effective opposition (in this it was also dulled by the outcome of the Iranian revolution), and too little importance in the strategic and financial alliances that supported the mujahideen efforts in Afghanistan. As a result, the Jama’at’s foreign policy has become “jihad-oriented,” desperately seeking to capture the Afghan moment by advocating other jihads. Veterans of the Afghan conflict who now fight their governments in Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, or Kashmir also came away with the delusion that the Afghan campaign was a simple triumph of jihad over secularism.

The same is true of Islamist groups in Pakistan whose “jihadist” outlook parallels that of the Jama’at and encourages the party to view jihad as a suitable model for struggle for power and a useful paradigm for explicating the Islamist agenda and its conception of political action to the Pakistani public. In this climate the Jama’at has become more open to using the concept of jihad in its political platform. The party’s leader Qazi Husain Ahmad has confirmed the centrality of jihad to the Jama’at’s political discourse by declaring that “the negation of the holy war was in fact negation of life itself.”

He has also repeatedly threatened Pakistani governments with launching jihad. The party has carefully cultivated the jihad consciousness, which it then uses in its struggle of power with the state.

It is true that the idealism of the jihad fits well with the party’s ideological orientation, but the manner in which it has begun to color the party’s view of international affairs owes to more than ideology. The party’s current foreign policy suggests that its leadership has either not yet sobered from that apparent victory or is nostalgic for the fecund days of the conflict. The Jama’at became involved in the Afghan war in partnership with the Pakistan military. Its role in the conflict was envisioned and largely shaped by the generals, as well as by the
positive dividends which participation in the war. In the process, the Zia ul-Haq regime, which oversaw the war, converted the Jama'at from a largely domestic political party into an instrument of the state’s foreign adventures and gave it an acute consciousness of the possibilities—ideological as well as financial and political—of a wider role for the party beyond Pakistan. That consciousness became integral to the party's ideological posture, view of its role in Pakistan, and the manner in which it formulates and implements its agenda. The place of jihad in the party’s foreign policy thinking has to be understood in the context of the broader set of pragmatic and ideological interests that govern the party's perspective.

The Islamic State

Equally important to this discussion of Islamist principles is Mawdudi’s conception of the Islamic state. The Islamic state is the culmination and the raison d’être of the Islamic movement: a utopian ideal, a just order based on the teachings of the sharia and the rule of the prophet and his immediate successors (known as the “rightly-guided caliphs,” 632-61 A.D.), which guarantees the continuity of the faith and Muslim piety. Thus the Islamic state may seem anachronistic. Yet the Islamic state is a model of governance that was conceived in contradistinction to Western models and does not therefore represent a return to premodern sociopolitical organization. Although Islamist thinkers, Mawdudi prominent among them, have sought to define the Islamic state in terms of sharia concepts and early Islamic institutions, there is little doubt that what they seek to define is a constellation of modern organizations, performing functions associated with modern states. That Mawdudi characterized the Islamic state in terms that emphasize its hybrid nature, such as a “theodemocracy” or a “democratic caliphate”—using adjectives that come from Western political ideals rather than from the sharia—attests to this tendency. The concept of the Islamic state is therefore a tacit acceptance of the paradigm of the nation-state system, and through it an acceptance of an international system.
Mawdudi did not write prolifically about human rights, and what he did write was not until later in his career. Human rights had not been important to conceptions of the state in the West when Mawdudi’s views on politics and statecraft were formed. He only addressed the issue when the Islamic state came under attack for having authoritarian proclivities and excluding minorities. Mawdudi’s rejection of such criticisms of the Islamic state and his attempt to question the ethical moorings of Western notions of human rights were perhaps predictable. What is more interesting is what Mawdudi’s treatment of human rights reveals about his universalist inclinations within a national framework. Mawdudi argued that non-Muslim minorities’ rights in the Islamic state would be those specified in the sharia’s teachings on the dhimmis (protected subjects who were followers of a religion recognized by Islam), and he alluded to the Ottoman millet system, whereby the empire was organized along communal lines, to a significant extent, as an example of how the Islamic state might work.28

Before those who criticized the division of the population of the Islamic state between Muslims and non-Muslims and the treatment of non-Muslims as second class citizens, Mawdudi was unapologetic. Interestingly, he did not simply assert that such a division was mandated by the sharia, but justified his prescriptions in terms of Western conceptions of the state and the rights of the citizenry in them. He argued that the Islamic state was not defined solely by its territorial boundary; it was an ideological state, with Islam serving as its protector and raison d’être. Hence, preserving the purity of the state’s ideology was its foremost concern,29 and one that justified excluding from authority or from any position that could influence the working of the state those not subscribing to its ethos (e.g., voters).30 He added that Western democracies and communist regimes alike have treated their national and ideological minorities in a similar fashion, although they might not admit to it.31 He denied that the dhimmi-Muslim dichotomy was undemocratic, sug-
gesting to the contrary that to force the majority to abide by the dictates of the minority would be undemocratic.\footnote{22}

In recent years the debate over human rights in the Islamic state has been rekindled, now including women’s rights.\footnote{23} During the Zia ul-Haq years (1977–88), the Women’s Action Forum (WAF) opposed those aspects of Islamization that limited or reduced women’s rights. WAF’s platform was premised on international legal and human rights norms, and it enjoyed the support of feminist movements abroad.\footnote{24} The Jama’at, which supported both Islamization and the Zia regime, opposed WAF and advocated what is known as the “relativity of human rights”—namely, that Muslims have their own standards of human rights and should not have to submit to Eurocentric norms. The Jama’at’s position was strengthened in the 1990s with Malaysia’s open defense of Asian values.\footnote{25}

Moreover, the Jama’at claimed that Muslim societies and Islamic law provide better for women than Western societies, as evidenced by the lower incidences of rape and sexual violence in Muslim societies.\footnote{26} But when WAF mobilized around the sexual misconduct of police toward women in custody and the political uses of rape,\footnote{27} the Jama’at’s position proved unconvincing. The party then fell back on the old argument that human rights advocacy is a means of undermining Muslim culture by secularizing and subjugating Muslim societies.\footnote{28} This attitude governed its position on the Vienna conference on human rights and the Beijing conference on women.

From 1998 to 1999, a number of incidents of human rights violations against the Christian minority occurred in Karachi and rural Punjab, as well as against the Muhajir community in Sind. In these cases the Jama’at condemned the use of violence, but defended the right of the state (vis-à-vis Muhajirs) and majority Muslims (vis-à-vis Christians) to protect their respective interests. The party, moreover, rejected international condemnation of the human rights infractions as unwarranted interference in Pakistan’s affairs and proof of the Western bias against Islam.

The foregoing has shown that Mawdudi’s views of international relations were a fusion of universalist and nationalist ideas.
Given his overwhelming influence on the movement, it is not surprising that the Jama’at’s foreign policy has displayed universalist inclinations just as it has been grounded in Pakistani nationalism. In some ways the party’s foreign policy is reminiscent of communist foreign policy soon after the formation of the Soviet Union, when the greater interests of international communism were weighed against the pursuit of state and national interests to strengthen the first bastion of communism. The latter view prevailed, confirming a pragmatic and nationalist foreign policy for the Soviet state, albeit couched in a universalist rubric.

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The architects of the Jama’at’s foreign policy have varied with the time period in question. Early in the party’s history, foreign policy positions were espoused by Mawdudi but without any specific agenda. He simply spoke his mind or articulated the party’s position on single issues as they became important in the domestic political scene. It was not until the 1970s that the party began to develop systematic thinking on such areas of interest to Pakistan as Afghanistan, relations with the Persian Gulf states, Western powers, defense considerations, international economic relations, and Pakistan’s place in regional and international alignments.

It was also in the 1970s that the younger generation of Jama’at leaders, educated in modern subjects in universities in Pakistan as well as the West, assumed positions of authority. The rise of this generation to power has generally streamlined the Jama’at’s thinking on a host of issues, one of which is foreign policy. The party thus moved away from reliance on its leadership for ad hoc responses to events, and began actively to formulate foreign policy, influencing Pakistan’s foreign policy in the process. To sustain and promote its international role, the Jama’at has created new institutional arrangements. For example, the party established an international affairs bureau that has
been coordinating the Jama’at’s formal relations with Islamic
groups and governments abroad. In addition, research institutes
loosely affiliated with the Jama’at have become a center for for-
eign policymaking and for informing national leaders of the
Jama’at’s views. The most notable of these is the Institute of
Policy Studies in Islamabad, led by Khurshid Ahmad. Among
its founding figures are Ijaz Gilani and Tahir Amin, both of
whom received doctoral degrees in political science from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The other institution of
note is the Institute of Regional Studies of Peshawar.

As Jama’at members and leaders have joined the government
or served in the parliament, they have inevitably been forced to
think about foreign policy questions and to push the party to de-
velop a foreign policy perspective. The new institutional
arrangements serve these leaders in achieving their goals. In
sum, generational change in the Jama’at has encouraged the de-
velopment of greater international thinking, and the necessary
institutional arrangements vest the party with the means to do
so effectively and with continuity over time.

Meanwhile, many pro-Jama’at students have been recruited
into state institutions such as the ministries of finance and for-
eign affairs that deal with foreign policy. In these institutions the
new recruits have begun to change the dominant culture left
over since the colonial era, and to push for new ways of con-
ceiving of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The new recruits have not
managed to fundamentally change policymaking, at least not
yet, but they present the possibility for a continued role for Is-
lamism in Pakistan’s foreign policy. A similar beginning in 1965
transformed the military; it will most likely do the same in the
foreign policymaking institutions.

The Role of State Policy
An important factor, often ignored in discussions of Islamist
views on foreign policy, is the role of state actors and policies. It
may be a vindication of realist theories of international relations
to argue that states matter greatly in shaping Islamist attitudes
toward the world order. There is no doubt that early on—as it will
become evident below—the Pakistani state had tried to limit any role for the Jama’at in the foreign policy arena. From the middle of the 1960s, however, the Pakistani state began to encourage a role for the Jama’at in the foreign policy arena, and often nudged it toward ideological posturing that was needed to manage covert operations. The state also sought to regulate the party’s international role—in effect, allowing the Jama’at a say only when and where the government deemed it appropriate. The problem here was that although the state was largely successful in controlling the Jama’at’s international activities, it helped cultivate the party’s appetite for foreign policy. Since this appetite developed in the framework of pursuing Pakistan’s national interests, it entrenched the party’s national identity and participation in the political process and institutionalized its relationship with the state.

In 1965 Ayub Khan involved the Jama’at in his India policy after the failure of his military campaign for Kashmir. In 1971 the government of Yahya Khan encouraged the Jama’at to lead delegations to Europe and the Arab world to shore up support for Pakistan’s campaign of terror in East Pakistan. From 1975 onward, the government, first under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later under Zia, drew the Jama’at into its Afghan policy and then into Kashmir and Central Asia. In all these cases the government’s domestic and international needs spurred it to bring the Jama’at into the foreign policy arena.

Nor has the Pakistani government been the only one to involve the Jama’at in international issues. Saudi Arabia and later Iran managed, or at least tried, to use the Jama’at for their own foreign policy agendas. Since the 1960s Saudi Arabia has viewed the Jama’at as an important ally in implementing its policies vis-à-vis Iran in South Asia, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, and to some extent even in the Arab world. It has involved the Jama’at in its international agencies, such as the Rabitah al-’Alam al-Islami, or international educational projects, and provided direct financial support to the party. Consequently the Jama’at has developed a vested interest in particular international perspectives that are not necessarily in keeping with the Pakistani govern-
ment’s position. This is an Islamic foreign policy that is “rent-seeking” at its core. The relationships that were fostered in this fashion, however, proved to be of less influence on the Jama’at’s foreign policy than on its domestic political interests. During the Gulf War, the party served its perceived domestic interests rather than its financial patrons, despite some measure of internal party resistance.

Between 1993 and 1996, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto sought to stem the Jama’at’s influence on Pakistani foreign affairs by using her government’s own foreign relations as a means of marginalizing the party. During her visit to the United States in 1995, Benazir Bhutto characterized Pakistan as a moderate Muslim state besieged with militant “fundamentalism”—a state deserving Western support and partnership in confronting a common challenge. The Jama’at viewed Benazir’s attempt to construct a new nexus between Islamabad and Washington as a surreptitious attempt to cleanse Pakistan’s politics of Islamic forces. The Jama’at newsletter, Resurgence, strongly objected to Benazir’s endorsement of the term “fundamentalism” to define Islamic parties in Pakistan, and the implication that the Jama’at was an extremist party. In the end, the government’s use of foreign policy postures to control domestic politics evoked a stronger response from the Jama’at than Benazir’s attempt at rapprochement with Washington.

Since 1997, Nawaz Sharif has followed a variation of the same policy. His government poses as a moderate Islamic alternative that lays claim to the Jama’at’s constituency. This posture has compelled the Jama’at to more clearly define its agenda, both domestically and internationally, in tandem with undermining the government’s claim to Islamicity. This has pushed the party toward more radical posturing on Islamic issues and greater activism on international issues where the government’s association with the United States could be exploited as a liability.

Kashmir
The Jama’at’s first foreign policy position was on Kashmir. No sooner had Mawdudi arrived in Pakistan than he impressed on
the government the importance of taking the offensive and securing control of strategic locations in the province.42 The Jama’at’s position on Kashmir was not very different from what the majority of Pakistanis favored: the Muslim majority province should join Pakistan, and if necessary, Pakistanis should go to war to realize that end. Mawdudi asserted that rather than conducting a covert jihad campaign in Kashmir (as discussed above), Pakistan should openly declare war on India to fight for the province. The Pakistani government responded by accusing the Jama’at of undermining the valiant efforts of volunteers fighting in Kashmir. Thus Mawdudi’s hawkishness was overshadowed by his ostensible lack of patriotism.

More than any other factor, the political damage that the Jama’at suffered from Mawdudi’s stance in 1948 has since determined its Kashmir policy. Its policy since 1948 has been based on its attempt to speak for Pakistani nationalism and to respond to domestic political imperatives. The party’s desire to strengthen its organization and political standing serves to explain its Kashmir policy better than any ideological explanation could. The Jama’at did not try to push the Kashmir issue into the limelight but addressed it if and when it was debated in the political arena. When the Jama’at did speak on Kashmir, it used the occasion to underscore its fidelity to Pakistan and the Kashmir cause and to try to erase the memory of its confrontation with the government. When Pakistan and India went to war over Kashmir in 1965, Mawdudi lost no time in declaring a jihad, as if to defend the logic of his argument of 1948.

In 1988, the Kashmir issue turned again into a crisis. The Jama’at, which at the time was a member of the opposition coalition, the Islamic Democratic Alliance (Islami Jumhuri Ittihad), quickly rallied for a jihad and pushed for strong government support of Kashmiri secessionist forces, breaking with the alliance to openly support Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s more confrontational position—although the Jama’at was generally opposed to her government.43 The Jama’at’s position was also influenced by a number of other considerations beyond domestic politics. As the Afghan war (discussed below) was coming to
a close, the Jama’at hoped that a similar jihad in Kashmir would help the party maintain the financial and paramilitary networks that it had already established. It also viewed jihad as useful in keeping organizational spirits high, recruiting new workers, popularizing the Jama’at as a patriotic and heroic force, and avoiding costly organizational changes which the end of the Afghan campaign would precipitate.

Furthermore, during the Afghan war and to some extent during the Sikh drive for independence in India’s Punjab province in the 1980s, the Jama’at had developed strong organizational ties with the Pakistani military. In particular, the party forged a close relationship with the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), which had masterminded the mujahideen campaigns against Soviet forces and was now suspected of involvement in Kashmir. The ISI, and the military establishment generally, were then supportive of a tough stance on Kashmir. From the mid-1980s, several mujahideen training camps under the Jama’at’s control, such al-Badr, began to train Kashmiri freedom fighters.

Another catalyzing factor for the Jama’at’s involvement in Kashmir was the role of Kashmiri Jama’at-i Islami activists. Since 1947 Kashmir has had its own Jama’at-i Islami party, independent from but ideologically close to the Pakistani and Indian Jama’ats. Kashmir’s Jama’at operated some 1,000 seminaries and schools in the vale of Kashmir in 1988.44 The organizational and ideological ties among some of the fighters—that were fostered in seminaries and military training camps—drew the Pakistani Jama’at into the crisis.

Moreover, the Jama’at was encouraged by India’s attempt to portray the uprising as a “fundamentalist” conspiracy master-minded by Pakistan. This gave the party an aura of power at a time when its electoral showings were poor. Holding the Jama’at responsible for the uprising, while useful in denying sympathy to Kashmiris in the West, credited Islamism with capabilities that it did not possess. The Jama’at was only too eager for its ideology to be held up as a force of empowerment and liberation, capable of pinning down 200,000 Indian troops for 5 years.

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The more the Jama'at’s political fortunes in Pakistan have sagged, the more it has sought to use Kashmir to shore up its position. Since 1993, when its parliamentary representation dropped to three, its rhetoric on Kashmir has heated up. The Jama'at has organized demonstrations, challenged the government to take action, and sought credit for guerrilla operations in Kashmir. For instance, the Kashmiri guerrilla commander Mast Gul, who was responsible for the standoff and fire at the Muslim shrine in Charar Sharif in May 1995, toured Pakistan in the company of the Jama'at’s amir, Qazi Husain Ahmad. The tour was somewhat embarrassing to the Pakistani government, which had denied any connection with the commander. These days, unlike in 1948, eager to boost its nationalist credentials, the Jama'at supports covert operations, and does not appear to be bound by Mawdudi’s strictures on unofficial jihads.

Since 1995, however, the government has taken control of most Jama'at training camps and networks of freedom fighters, handing them over to the Deobandi Jami'at-i 'Ulama-i Islam (Society of 'Ulama of Islam, JUI) and their allies. The al-Badr camp in Afghanistan—until it was destroyed by U.S. missile in retaliation for the bombing of American embassies in Africa—trained the Deobandi Harakatu'l-Ansar (Movement of the Ansar, renamed Harakatu'l-Mujahedin, or Mujahedin's Movement) and Da'wa wa Irshad (Propagation and Guidance) and its sister organization, Lashkar-i Tayyibah (Army of the Pure). The Jama'at’s influence on operations in Kashmir has thus waned considerably.

Although no longer the front Islamist organization in managing militants in Kashmir, the Jama'at strongly supports Islamist activism there. In July 1999 the party spearheaded the Islamist opposition to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to withdraw support from militants that had infiltrated the border at Kargil. The Jama'at’s demonstration drew 30,000 and made it difficult for Nawaz Sharif to contend with the political fallout of his decision. The Jama'at’s actions here been motivated by its commitment to the Islamist war of liberation in Kashmir, as well as by the desire to remain relevant to the conflict. The party also
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hopes to use the crisis to mobilize support for itself and deny it to the government.

OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES

India
To date, the Jama’at-i Islami has not formulated a particular outlook on Pakistan’s regional interests and policy options. The party has always echoed the general anti-Indian sentiments of Pakistanis, although it has not been generally preoccupied with India, nor made pronouncements any more militant than those of other parties or social forces. On occasion, it has adopted distinctive postures, such as its opposition to cultural relations between India and Pakistan in the belief that the flow of Indian films or music into Pakistan will corrupt its Islamic orientation. Since the destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya and the rise of the Hindu nationalist BJP to power, however, the Jama’at has become more concerned with India, and has sought to more directly influence Pakistan’s India policy. It has also sought to gain politically from Pakistani’s apprehensions about India. Hence, the party strongly opposed talks between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterparts, I.K. Gujral of India in 1997 and A.B. Vajpayee during the Lahore summit of 1999. The Jama’at orchestrated street demonstrations and clashes to oppose Vajpayee’s visit, and the promised normalization of trade and diplomatic relations between the India and Pakistan that came out of the Lahore summit. The clashes led to the arrest of a number of Jama’at activists. Subsequently, the Jama’at escalated its attacks on Nawaz Sharif, and declared that, “the government has gone berserk.”

The party’s views on relations with India also owe to the relations of its leaders and rank and file members with India. Many in the Jama’at are migrants (mubajirs) who came to Pakistan at the time of the partition, and like millions of other Pakistanis of the same origin, they are highly indophobic. The Jama’at’s close
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political ties with the Muhajir community in Sind has added incentive for the party to follow a hardline policy on India.

Finally, through its position on Pakistan’s relation with India the Jama'at has sought to capitalize on public anger at India’s decision to test its nuclear capability in 1998. The Jama'at has always strongly supported Pakistan’s nuclear program. Over the course of the past two years it has become more ardent in its support. After India tested its weapons in 1998, there was considerable international pressure put on Pakistan not to follow suit. The Jama'at was at the forefront of domestic pressure on Nawaz Sharif to carry out nuclear tests of its own in response to Indian moves. The party so strongly urged the government in this regard that many in Pakistan joked that perhaps Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were kept at Jama'at headquarters in Lahore. The Jama'at has since 1998 opposed the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and threatened the government with public uprisings if it were to do so.

The Jama’at was no doubt impressed by the extent to which the religious nationalist ruling party of India at the time, the BJP, gained popularity from carrying out nuclear tests. The Jama'at also believes that its strong support for Pakistan’s nuclear program will give it nationalist credentials and strengthen it before the ruling order. As a result, the party has developed a coherent position on the nuclear question owing to the importance of the issue to the party’s interests in the domestic political arena.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh presents a more complex picture. The Jama'at was opposed to the secession of east Pakistan, and actively participated in the brutal military campaign to crush Bengali nationalism between 1969 and 1971. Once Bangladesh was created, many Jama'at workers and leaders were executed or incarcerated by the Mujibur Rahman government. Many left Bangladesh for Pakistan, while others stayed to form the Jama'at-i Islami of Bangladesh. From 1971 to 1974, the Pakistani Jama'at-i Islami spearheaded the opposition to recognition of Bangladesh (the Bangladesh Namanzur campaign). The party argued that the
government should not officially recognize the dismemberment of Pakistan along ethnic lines, as Muslim unity should supersede Pakistani and Bengali identities—that is, umma above nation. The Jama’at was also eager to undermine Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government, which it viewed as responsible for the civil war. By opposing Bhutto’s initiative to recognize Bangladesh (to which he had agreed in his meeting with Indira Gandhi at the Simla conference in 1972), the Jama’at hoped to convince Pakistanis that Bhutto had sold out their national interests to India, and was only too happy to wash his hands of East Pakistan—proof of his culpability in the disaster. Hence, the party’s pan—Islamic zeal had a domestic political motivation behind it.

Since both Pakistan and Bangladesh pursued Islamization under military regimes in the 1980s, the Jama’at welcomed closer ties between the two countries and lauded General Ershad’s Islamization of Bangladesh. In this, the Pakistani Jama’at was no doubt influenced by its sister party in Bangladesh. As a result, the commitment of the Bangladesh state to Islamization combined with the desire to help the Jama’at-i Islami of Bangladesh led the Jama’at to change its posture toward that country. This change of posture was also made possible by the fact that the anti-Bangladesh posture provided no political gains to the party, and in the drive to contain India, Bangladesh was an obvious ally.

Afghanistan
The most important regional question for the Jama’at, however, has been Afghanistan. It was not until the late 1970s that the Jama’at put forward an Afghan policy, since the party had no notable presence in provinces bordering on Afghanistan during the 1947–71 period and it viewed Afghanistan as less important than other foreign policy concerns. Between 1947 and 1977, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were confrontational as the two disputed over borders, and Afghans were suspected of promoting Pathan nationalism in Pakistan’s Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). The Jama’at strongly opposed any form of local nationalism that
would threaten the unity of Pakistan, as it had in the case of Bengali nationalism in east Pakistan.

The Jama’at became more interested in Afghanistan in the 1970s as the party developed a base of support in NWFP. In addition, with the fall of the monarchy in Afghanistan in 1974 to the Daud Khan regime—which was avowedly Pathan nationalist, and was irredentist vis-à-vis Pakistan—the Pakistani government began to solicit the Jama’at’s support in managing the rising tensions on its border with Afghanistan. As a player in NWFP politics emphasizing Islamic unity and “Pakistaniness” over parochial nationalisms, the Jama’at was an important potential ally for the central government. Just as Daud supported Pathan nationalists in Pakistan, Pakistan began to train and encourage Islamist resistance to Daud’s secular government. The Jama’at was key in the development of links with Afghan Islamist movements, such as Gulbedin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party).

Soon after Daud Khan took power, the Bhutto government invited Qazi Husain Ahmad, then a Jama’at leader in NWFP, to help formulate Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The Jama’at’s involvement only increased with the communist takeover of Afghanistan. Following Nur Muhammad Taraki’s coup in 1977, Generals Zia ul-Haq and Fazl-i Haq met with Mawdudi, Mian Tufayl Muhammad (amir at the time), and Qazi Husain Ahmad to explore ways for the Jama’at to help with Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The party was important not only in managing the Islamist uprising in Afghanistan, but also in giving Zia’s regime moral legitimacy by characterizing the Afghan war as a jihad.

The Jama’at’s role in the war is not easily defined. The party played a limited part in strategic decisions or operations and managed only a portion of the logistical or humanitarian efforts. Its main contribution was symbolic, designed to give credence to the notion of jihad. Involvement in the war, however, had a profound impact on the Jama’at. First, it brought the party into Pakistan’s foreign policymaking process, which taught party leaders much about foreign policymaking and forced them to develop regional and global perspectives. In short, it transformed abstract and inchoate foreign policy notions into con-
crete foreign policy thinking. Second, the war created organizational linkages between the Jama’at and Pakistani and Saudi Arabian military and intelligence units. Aside from the benefit of military training, these contacts have been important to the party politically. Third, the Jama’at benefited from the war financially as it managed humanitarian and military aid. Finally, with the tacit support of the government, the Jama’at was put in charge of managing the refugee population. This strengthened the party’s base of power in NWFP, as it used its humanitarian efforts and control of aid disbursements to recruit support among refugees, many of whom were Pathans and hence indistinguishable from inhabitants of NWFP during elections.

The Jama’at took the Afghan jihad seriously. Many party workers became involved in various aspects of the effort, and student supporters in particular went into the battlefield. Between 1980 and 1990, some 72 pro-Jama’at students were killed fighting in Afghanistan, some of whom were the sons of high-ranking Jama’at officials. The commitment was so strong that the Afghan model, a “jihad of liberation,” subsequently dominated the Jama’at’s thinking, a fact which is clearly reflected in their response to the current crisis in Kashmir. Overlooking the significance of the American and Pakistani governments in the war, the party came to view the collapse of the Soviet-backed government in Kabul—the first time a rollback of communism had been achieved—as a victory for Islam and proof of the political and military power of an Islamically inspired struggle. It is also likely that the Jama’at viewed Afghanistan as the most viable place for an Islamic state, after which Pakistan would follow suit. For these reasons, the Jama’at looked at the jihad as more than a foreign policy venture.

Since 1988 the party has sought to duplicate the success of the Afghan scene in other cases. In this the Jama’at has not been alone; Islamist activists from Algeria to Egypt, Saudi Arabia to Central and southeast Asia, and freedom fighters in Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines have also sought to emulate the Afghan formula—organizing and waging political and guerrilla campaigns as jihads.
The Jama’at continued to play a role in Pakistan’s Afghan policy, at least until 1993. Qazi Husain Ahmad’s close ties to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were deemed important by the Pakistani leadership in subsuming Pathan nationalism under an Islamic banner. This would thwart attention from the old lines of conflict between the two countries and focus attention on ideological commonalities favoring a role for Pakistan in Afghanistan. The ties have also enabled Pakistan’s continued management of the conflict. For instance, in early 1996, Qazi Husain Ahmad forged the agreement between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the powerful mujahideen commander and minister of defense in the first post-Soviet government in Kabul, Ahmad Shah Masood. The deal installed Hekmatyar as prime minister of Afghanistan prior to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul.

In recent years, the Jama’at’s role in Afghanistan has been greatly diminished as the Taliban, who are Pathans and are tied to the Deobandi JUI, have replaced the Qazi–Hekmatyar nexus. The JUI became more important on the Afghan scene after 1993, when it entered into an alliance with the government of Prime Minister Bhutto. The Jama’at, in contrast, had no links with that government. In addition, the alliance between Hekmatyar and Tajiks (that was brokered by Qazi Husain) prompted Pakistan’s Pathan elite into action. Pathan military commanders in the military and the ISI, in cooperation with Benazir’s Pathan minister of interior—General Nasirullah Babur—conspired to ensure Pathan rule over Afghanistan. In order to achieve this they undermined Hekmatyar and his alliance with the Masood/Burhanuddin Rabbani faction (and the Jama’at), and looked to a new Pathan force (the Taliban). The Jama’at was thus sidelined in the Afghan scene, and was replaced by JUI, which had close ties with the Taliban. The Qazi–Hekmatyar nexus was replaced by one between JUI’s Mawlana Fazlur Rahman and Taliban’s Mulla Umar as Pakistan military’s instrument for controlling Afghanistan.

The rise of the Taliban quickly influenced Pakistan’s politics. The movement’s meteoric rise in Afghanistan created much enthusiasm for it in Islamist circles in Pakistan, and
given Taliban’s connections with the Deobandi establishment in Pakistan, created a “Talibanization” of Pakistan. As a result, Islamist forces became more strident in their rhetoric, and grew more jihadist and revolutionary. The change of scene in Pakistan forced the Jama’at to adopt a more revolutionary posture in order to protect its position in Islamist circles. The party became more anti-American, and openly called for jihad against the government. Although the Jama’at’s call to action and anti-Western posturing are more sophisticated than the rhetoric of JUI and its offshoots, and although the party’s focus on key policy positions such as relations with IMF or signing the CTBT, they still put forward an uncompromising and belligerent front. This shift in posture owes to the radicalization of the Jama’at’s constituency and primary milieu of operation after the ascent of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

THE GREATER MUSLIM WORLD AND MUSLIM ISSUES

Conceiving of Jama’at’s Role in the Muslim World
Throughout his life, Mawdudi strove for wide recognition as a Muslim thinker and leader. In particular, he traveled in the Arab world, meeting religious leaders and thinkers to cultivate support for his ideas. In certain cases, as in Saudi Arabia, the government afforded him recognition. Both King Saud and King Faysal invited him to the Kingdom, provided support for the Jama’at, and on one occasion, at Mawdudi’s behest, awarded Pakistan the contract to weave the ceremonial cloth covering the Ka’bah, the shrine in Mecca that is the focal point of the annual pilgrimage. Mawdudi served as a trustee of the Medina University, and in 1979 he was awarded the prestigious King Faisal award for his services to Islam. Mawdudi sought links with the Arab world not only to make his work available to Muslims there, but to earn legitimacy by association with the central lands of Islam and the Arabic literary canon.
The Andalus Syndrome

In addition to Mawdudi’s personal ambitions, the Jama’at’s relationship with the rest of the Muslim world has been conditioned by the notion that “Islam is in danger.” Among South Asian Muslims this sentiment is particularly strong, and has more than symbolic importance. The marginalization of Indian Muslims, and the occlusion of their power in their traditional centers of politics, arts and culture, including Lucknow, Delhi, and Hyderabad, has anchored their religious-political thinking in the fear of marginalization and disappearance. The scholar Akbar S. Ahmed has argued that South Asian Muslims are very much afflicted by what he terms the Andalus syndrome, or fear of a Moorish fate. It is interesting to note that whereas across the Arab world the 500th anniversary of Muslim expulsion from Spain went largely unnoticed, in India and Pakistan it was marked by a series of publications.

Deeply affected by the fall of the Muslim princely state of Hyderabad, Mawdudi was particularly prone to the “Andalus syndrome.” In fact, he drew parallels between Hyderabad and Andalusia on a number of occasions. This concern also guided the Jama’at’s approach to the East Pakistan debacle. In a telegram to Shaykh Mujibur Rahman in March 1971, Mawdudi warned him against precipitating a crisis that would be greater than the tragedy of Islamic Spain. The Jama’at’s position on events in Kashmir, Bosnia, or India since the Ayodhya incident have also been guided by the fear of extinction of Islam. Likewise, the popular pro-Jama’at weekly Takbir has covered the uprising in Kashmir since 1988, the plight of Muslims in Bosnia, and the Hindu nationalist onslaught against Muslims in India within the same framework of analysis. Even some secular parties, like the ethnic Muhajir National Movement (MQM), have used the Andalus Syndrome as a political tool.

Advocacy of Muslim Causes

The Jama’at’s ties to the Muslim world have been alternately strengthened and weakened by its advocacy on behalf of Muslim activists abroad. In the role of advocate, the party has long
been critical of secular regimes in the Muslim world and their treatment of the Islamic opposition. In 1963 during a trip to Mecca, Mawdudi met with Ayatollah Khomeini; shortly thereafter, Tarjumanul-Quran, the Jama’at’s official journal, published an article that severely criticized the shah’s regime and its secularizing policies. Mawdudi was subsequently imprisoned for sabotaging Pakistan’s foreign policy. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Jama’at (encouraged by Saudi Arabia) criticized Nasser’s treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In later years, the party became even more vocal in advocating the cause of Islamist opposition groups from Algeria to Tajikistan. The Jama’at’s newsletter, Resurgence, has been quite prolific, providing Islamist interpretations of events in various Muslim countries. The Jama’at’s Idarah-i Ma’arif-i Islami (Islamic Studies Bureau) has been active in translating works of Islamist leaders and accounts of their struggles in the Philippines, Palestine, Algeria, Turkey, Chechnya, and the Arab Near East. In addition, the Idarah now publishes annual reports on the status of the Muslim world which cover the activities of Islamist movements. Finally, the Jama’at augments the Idarah’s published material with an array of video and cassette recordings on the same topics, and more recently, use of the internet.

The greater prominence of Islamist activism across the Muslim world has created within Pakistan and the Jama’at a consciousness about the importance and relevance of international events. In recent years the Jama’at’s international relations office has grown in size and prominence, partly because the Jama’at’s leadership has been more mobile. The amir of the Jama’at, Qazi Husain Ahmad, is now viewed as a national politician. In this capacity he routinely travels abroad, and in Pakistan meets with visiting foreign officials and foreign ambassadors on a regular basis. Others, like Khurshid Ahmad (one of the party’s leaders who is a noted Islamist ideologue of international renown in his own right), travel across the Muslim world and to the West or work at institutions such as the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, England, or the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur. Such exposure has increased the party’s consciousness about
global issues. The Saudi and Malaysian sponsorship of international Islamic conferences, transnational agencies, and institutions has had a similar effect. Even within Pakistan, the increased participation of Jama’at members in parliament and the government since 1977 has exposed them to foreign policymaking and the importance and complexities of international relations.

The greater international consciousness of the Jama’at and its contacts across the Muslim world and in the West have given it an international reach that is unique to Islamist movements. The Jama’at’s organizational and intellectual networks extend beyond South Asia. The party has a strong presence in Central Asia and is closely tied to Islamist forces in the Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and north and sub-Saharan Africa. It also has a strong organizational presence in Europe and North America. Only the Muslim Brotherhood can boast of a similar transnational reach. Still, the Brotherhood’s network is not as expansive. Within the Muslim world it is limited to Arab countries; and in the West its presence is not as strong as that of the Jama’at. Moreover, the Brotherhood has not operated as an international network in the manner that the Jama’at has—tying various domestic, regional and international concerns into integrated and singular policy objectives, and mobilizing international resources to realize them. The Jama’at’s international reach and perspective has allowed it to play an important role in shaping Islamist perspectives on issues of general concern to Muslims across the Muslim world. This role is best captured by the prelude to the Salman Rushdie crisis, which although associated with Ayatollah Khomeini, was first given attention by the Jama’at.

Soon after the publication of *Satanic Verses* in the West, Jama’at workers affiliated with the Islamic Foundation in Leicester read an interview with Rushdie about the book.69 Fa’izu’ddin Ahmad, one of the leaders of the Islamic Foundation, then circulated numerous photocopies of inflammatory passages in England before sending them to India and Pakistan—the two countries that first banned the book. He and Khurshid Ahmad traveled to Saudi Arabia to secure funding for the anti-Rushdie campaigns in England, which culminated in
the Bradford demonstrations and book burnings. The Bradford incident led to wide-spread protests in Pakistan against the book, led by the JUI leader, Mawlana Fazur Rahman, and the Islamically oriented politician, Kawthar Niyazi. The disturbances in Pakistan in turn led to Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa. Fazlur Rahman, Niyazi, or Khomeini took note of the *Satanic Verses* owing to the Jama’at’s efforts to mobilize Muslims against the book. That the Jama’at had an institutional presence in England and connections in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and India placed it in a unique position to detect the issue first, mobilize support for the cause, and get financial resources to agitate. Although this was not a consciously international action, it nevertheless demonstrated the party’s transnational characteristics.

*The Arab–Israeli Conflict*

Like other Islamists, the Jama’at has consistently supported Palestinian demands on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Since the Oslo agreement, the party has distinguished between the PLO and Islamist opponents of the peace process such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, viewing the latter as the genuine representatives of the Palestinian cause.60 The Arab-Israeli issue is not, however, a central concern of the Jama’at, and has never approached Kashmir or Afghanistan in importance. Furthermore, since the Pakistani government has always supported the Arab position, the Jama’at has not felt the need to bring supplementary attention to the issue. Still, a number of developments in recent years have made the Palestinian issue more complex and of increasing relevance to the Jama’at.

As the United States and Israel have sought to blame Islamists for impeding peace, the Jama’at has felt compelled to defend Islamist ideology. This has required the Jama’at to adopt a coherent policy position on the peace process. The party has argued that the Islamists’ rejection of an unfair and unacceptable peace process is justified, and that Yasir Arafat is a “sell out” who does not speak for the Palestinians. As for the future of Jerusalem, the Jama’at views it as more than a Palestinian-Israeli issue; it is an Islamic one. The possibility that the third-holiest city of Islam
might be placed under permanent non-Muslim jurisdiction evokes some of the Jama’at’s dearest concerns, including the defense of the caliphate and the fear of extinction of Islam.

The Jama’at’s position on the Arab-Israeli issue is likely to be important in the future of Pakistan’s relations with Israel. Soon after the Oslo agreement, measured steps were taken by both governments in the direction of normalizing relations. Pakistan even went so far as to hint at recognizing Israel. In 1994 the government arranged for the JUI leader, Mawlana Ajmal Qadri, to travel to the occupied territories. Qadri faced severe criticism from the Jama’at and other Islamists. More recently, the government has let it be known that it has been in contact with Israel.

The collapse of the Oslo process after the rise of Likud Party to power stopped that momentum. Whether Islamabad will in the future resume the initiative to recognize Israel is largely dependent on how it assesses the Jama’at’s (and other Islamic parties) response to the peace process. The Jama’at had opposed suggestions during the early phases of the Oslo process that the Organization of the Islamic Conference support recognition of Israel. It called on the government to quit the organization if it recognizes Israel. Further complicating Pakistani-Israeli relations is the belief widely held in Pakistan that Israel is behind American pressure to shut down Pakistan’s nuclear program. Thus the country sees a pincer nuclear threat from India and Israel, whose improved relations Pakistanis also blame for the diminished influence of their country in Washington. The Jama’at has strongly supported Pakistan’s nuclear program, equating any scaling back with giving in to American pressures. It has successfully cast the nuclear issue as a nationalist-Islamist cause—defense of Pakistan’s vital interests before the Indian threat and resistance to Western efforts to weaken Pakistan—couching strategic concerns in the language of Islamist anti-imperialism.

Central Asia, Chechnya, and China
Central Asia presents yet another arena of great concern for the Jama’at. Soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Jama’at initiated contacts with Islamist groups in the region and increased

Vali Nasr
the dissemination of its literature in the newly independent republics—particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The party construed these efforts as a continuation of the Afghan jihad, since Uzbekistan and Tajikistan border on Afghanistan and many Uzbeks and Tajiks had migrated to NWFP during the war. The Jama'at began translating its literature into local languages and establishing organizational contacts with local Islamic forces in those republics in 1977. Since 1977, a number of Central Asian Islamist activists and thinkers have spent time with the Jama'at in Pakistan, some of whom were recruited into the Jama'at, while others sought to emulate its organizational model in Central Asia. During the Soviet period, however, the party's ability to disseminate its publications and establish contacts were limited. However, that it had begun to penetrate the region—even in a limited fashion—meant that after the collapse of the Soviet Union it was well positioned to quickly influence politics.

The importance of the Pakistani poet and thinker, Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938)—whose work on Islamic thought has been important to contemporary discussions on Islam and politics, and whose works are widely known outside of Pakistan—and Mawdudi in the region has been of great help to the Jama'at, as has the Pakistani government's desire to establish a regional presence for trade purposes and to further strengthen its hold on Afghanistan. In fact, there has been strong suspicion in Central Asia itself—mainly in the secularly oriented government circles—that the Jama'at's push into Central Asia has been masterminded by the ISI. Without a doubt, Central Asia presents the Pakistani government with a good opportunity to divert the Jama'at's energies away from Pakistan. It also shows that relations between the state and the Jama'at in Pakistan are complex. The state has been generally wary of the Jama'at's influence on domestic politics, but on occasion, such as in Central Asia, it has found the party's politics and organizational reach useful to the aims of the Pakistan state. The Jama'at's relations with the state are therefore adversarial, but that does not preclude convergence of their interests and cooperation on key issues. Where and when Pakistan's international interests are furthered by use of
Islamic causes and symbolism, the Jama’at and the state find themselves interlocked in a symbiotic relationship.

The Jama’at’s growing interest in the region has given the party a broad vision of its reach and Pakistan’s regional role. They have also embroiled the party in the tussle between local and regional forces, secular governments and Islamic oppositions, and Russian and American interests. Situated thus, the Jama’at has been compelled to develop a coherent vision of its international activities within the context of Pakistan’s foreign policy needs and possibilities, subsuming pan-Islamism under national foreign policy.

The Jama’at’s Central Asian policy is also motivated by the party’s growing concern over Russian hostility to Islam. Some in the Jama’at have viewed Russian defense of secular authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, combined with its support for Serbia and the crackdown in Chechnya, as a stronger threat to the cause of Islam than American foreign policy. This has given defending Islam’s sociopolitical interests in Central Asia broader significance. Central Asia is viewed as a key battle in a larger anti-Russian war.

The Jama’at has recently extended its Central Asian strategy to include Uighur Muslims of Xinxiang province of China. Some 100 Uighur students are now enrolled at the International Islamic University in Islamabad and most are sponsored by the Jama’at. As China and India have moved toward normalizing relations, and the strategic ties between Beijing and Islamabad have weakened, the Pakistani government has turned a blind eye to activities that are surely viewed with concern in Beijing.

Relations with “Islamic” Governments
An interesting aspect of the Jama’at’s evolving foreign policy is its relations with governments sympathetic to Islamism. Since the time of Kings Sa’ud and Faysal, Saudi Arabia has been a key source of both political and financial support for the Jama’at. In recent years, Iran, Malaysia, and Sudan have joined the list of Jama’at supporters. The Jama’at has interacted with these governments both directly and as a representative of the Zia go-
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gernment, which itself was favorable to Islamic causes. These contacts have been largely symbolic, but by their nature have given the Jama’at an international role and perspective. In so far as the Jama’at has interacted with other governmental bodies as a Pakistani organization or as the representative of the Pakistani government, the party’s Islamic internationalism has been subsumed under the existing structure of the nation-state system which governs such contacts. This phenomenon is mirrored generally in the Muslim world as Islamic activities are increasingly sponsored by Muslim governments. For instance, over the course of the past two decades the most important conferences on Islamic education, Islamic economics, Islam and science and technology and the like have been sponsored by the governments of Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Iran—and some have been held under the aegis of the Organization of Islamic Conference. While the conferences have promoted Islamic solidarity and have helped set in motion greater transnational Islamic activity, they have been held as government-sponsored affairs in the context of existing nation-state system, which the structure of conferences have been designed to reflect.

Relations with Iran, and as a result Saudi Arabia, have been complex and interesting since 1979. The Jama’at was at first enthusiastic about the Islamic Republic of Iran, opposing Zia’s support of the shah in the 1977–79 period, and taking the initiative to establish contact with Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris in 1978. The Jama’at viewed the Islamic revolution as a positive step for Iranians, and perhaps as a good omen for its own efforts in Pakistan. However, the Jama’at was not willing to accede to Iran’s desire to dominate Islamism across the Muslim world—which was indeed what Khomeini believed Iran should do. The party resisted Iran’s attempts to influence domestic Pakistani political issues, and sided with the Zia regime when Iran demanded privileges for Pakistan’s Shiites.

Saudi Arabia and later Iraq were wary of Iran’s role in Pakistan and sought ways to check its influence. With this in mind, the Saudis pressured the Jama’at to lead an anti-Shiite Islamist campaign against Iran and its Pakistani allies. Jama’at leaders viewed
such blatant interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs as unwel-
come, and, moreover, did not wish to be a party to efforts to di-
vide Pakistani society along sectarian lines. Far more interested in
building consensus, Qazi Husain Ahmad traveled to Iran in 1995,
and after a meeting with President Hashemi Rafsanjani estab-
lished the Milli Yikjahati Council (National Council of Unity) to
bring leaders of diverse sectarian groups together and end the
bloodshed between Shiites and Sunnis militant organizations. Eventually Saudis and Iraqis invested in other Islamist organiza-
tions. The Jama'at's position showed that it was not prone to
influence by transnational connections if they ran counter to Pak-
istan's interests, or seemed to threaten Pakistan's national unity.

In August and September 1998, the sectarian issue found new
regional dimension. Tensions escalated after the fall of the cities
of Mazar Sharif and Bamiyan to the Taliban, who murdered a
number of Iranian diplomats and journalists in those cities, and
proceeded to massacre thousands of Shiite civilians in those cities,
and forced many others to flee to Iran. Faced with a brazen attack
on its nationals and diplomats, and unhappy with both the refugee
flow and the openly anti-Shiite policies of the Taliban, Iran
massed troops along its border with Afghanistan, and severely
criticized Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy. Although war was
averted the incident dealt a severe blow to Pakistan's relations with
Iran. The Jama'at used this occasion to underscore the folly of the
military's support for the Taliban, and more generally the De-
obandi JUI and its offshoots in managing regional conflicts. The
party argued that these forces had damaged Pakistan's foreign
policy interests, and their divisive sectarian posturing was an im-
pediment to the cause of Islam in Pakistan and regionally. The
Jama'at thus presented itself as the more moderate Islamist alter-
native that could serve the military's interests in Afghanistan and
Kashmir without undermining Pakistan's relations with Iran.

The Persian Gulf War
The war in the Persian Gulf is another interesting case in the
development of the Jama'at's foreign policy. The Jama'at had
traditionally been close to the Persian Gulf monarchies, as they
were generally Islamic and friendly to Pakistan. The Jama‘at had also benefited directly and indirectly from the largesse of the Persian Gulf states, through money and institutional support. Examples abound of the Gulf’s patronage of the Jama‘at: Mawdudi and Khurshid Ahmad had received the Faysal Award, the mosque at the Jama‘at’s headquarters was paid for by Kuwait, and the Islamic Foundation in Leicester was established with Saudi funding. In addition, many Jama‘at members and supporters had worked in the Persian Gulf and had ties there, as did many other Pakistanis whose votes the Jama‘at hoped to win.

Initially the Jama‘at supported Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and opposed Iraq’s invasion of its neighbor. As Pakistani migrant laborers returned from Kuwait and the economic impact was felt in Pakistan, the party echoed the government’s line. Still, the Jama‘at was apprehensive about American involvement in the Gulf, believing that the inter-Muslim dispute should be solved by Muslims alone. The Jama‘at was not persuaded that the U.S. intention was to liberate Kuwait; instead, it argued what was afoot was a “Zionist plot” to guarantee the security of Israel by dismantling the Muslim world’s strongest army. Khurshid Ahmad called the American policy a “trap,” designed to “entangle Iraq in war so that it could provide the United States with a chance to interfere and advance its sinister designs—to give an edge to Israel in the region and to control Muslim oil.”

There soon emerged a ground swell of support for Saddam Hussein in Pakistan. Latent hatred for the high-handed behavior of Saudis and Kuwaitis, anger at the United States’ unilateral cutoff of aid to Pakistan in 1990, and the increasing “America versus Iraq” image of the conflict led many Pakistanis to support Iraq. A number of Pakistani political actors, including some in the military and the left, responded to this development by adopting an anti-imperialist and pro-Iraq stance. The Jama‘at was divided over what to do.

In principle the party had little love for Saddam Hussein, whom it had always viewed as a secular despot. It was also financially dependent on and beholden to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Nevertheless, it disagreed with Saudi Arabia’s decision to allow
American forces to set up shop in the holy land and fight Muslims. The Jama'at therefore became active in seeking to resolve the crisis peacefully and preclude the need for Western involvement. Qazi Husain Ahmad was a member of the Islamist delegation that traveled to Saudi Arabia for talks with King Fahd in 1990. The delegation failed to influence Saudi policy, further escalating Islamist criticism of the Kingdom.

Qazi Husain felt that if the Jama'at was to champion the pro-Iraq cause it would expand its domestic base of support. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s electoral success in 1990 had in part been attributed to his adroit manipulation of anti-Americanism, and this was not lost on the Jama'at. Furthermore, the Jama'at’s objections to the U.S. decision to end the war in Afghanistan in 1989, and its resentment of the lack of American support for Muslim causes in Kashmir and Palestine made it easy for the party to join anti-American forces. Qazi Husain was of the opinion that the Persian Gulf monarchies would soon fall, and the Jama'at was not likely to incur a cost by supporting Iraq. Conscious of the changing tide of public opinion and somehow convinced of the ultimate victory of Saddam Hussein, the Jama'at abandoned any pretense of moderation as advent of the war dimmed the possibility of a resolution dimmed in January 1991, and openly supported Iraq throughout the remainder of the conflict. The Jama'at joined the ranks of the Tahrik-i Islami (Islamic Movement), a multinational Islamic umbrella organization which was coordinating support for Iraq across the Muslim world. Within Pakistan, the Jama'at organized 57 “jihad rallies” and 2 dozen “coffin-clad” rallies to emphasize that its workers were ready for martyrdom in the jihad against the “anti-Islamic forces of the West”; pro-Jama'at students bolstered the pro-Iraq campaign by organizing 338 public rallies and demonstrations during the same period.

At the cost of Saudi financial support and its ethical and ideological principles, the Jama'at had taken up Saddam Hussein's cause because it was popular. It had hoped that supporting Iraq against “American imperialism and its stooges” would separate

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its position from that of the government and breathe new life into the party. Domestic political imperatives thus guided the Jama'at’s position on this important regional issue.

Although since 1991 the Jama'at has mended its fences with Saudi Arabia, it continues to support Iraq, organizing rallies and demonstrations during subsequent confrontations between the United States and Iraq. Qazi Husain is of the belief that, the American position on Iraq combined with its unwavering support of Israel has eroded the legitimacy of pro-American governments in the region—which he continues to argue will soon fall—and is likely to provide the Jama'at with the opportunity to organize an effective drive for power in Pakistan. In the least, the Jama'at has used the ongoing standoff between the United States and Iraq to organize rallies, recruit new members, and put pressure on the Pakistan government.

The Jama'at’s Role in International Islamic Forums

The Jama'at’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world is further conditioned by its role in international Islamic forums and institutions. As a proponent of greater international role for Islamic organizations, and organizing transnational Islamic activities, the Jama'at has been the patron of a number of international institutions, notably the Islamic Foundation in England. In addition, it has been active in the World Muslim League (Rabitah al-'Alam al-Islami), alliances of Islamist forces such as the Tahrir-i Islami, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In an example showing the Jama'at’s respect for the OIC, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto managed to silence the Jama'at’s opposition to recognition of Bangladesh only after the OIC met in Lahore in 1974 and supported Bhutto’s position.

International fora have been important in shaping the Jama'at’s views on foreign affairs as they have exposed the Jama'at to international policymaking above and beyond rhetoric and ideological pronouncements. On the other hand, since the framework for many of these organizations replicates models molded by the nation-state system, the Jama'at’s international activities reaffirm its moorings in Pakistani national
identity. For instance, it is taken as a given that the Rabitah is
primarily a Saudi organization, and that the Jama'at is often a
representative of Pakistan in that forum. On another level, these
forums have created links with diverse Islamic and Islamist
forces, some of whom have influenced the Jama'at's politics in
Pakistan. Alternately, the Jama'at has been compelled to stream-
line its domestic agenda in light of its international role. Since
the Jama'at has required the tacit approval of the Pakistani gov-
ernment to be active in government-sponsored Islamic organi-
zations (such as those in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia), its do-
mestic policies and relations with the government have been
conditioned by its desire to keep an international profile.

More importantly, the Jama'at has supported nonpolitical
international Islamic activities. For instance, it has been a no-
table force in international Islamic university projects. The In-
ternational Islamic University of Islamabad is very much tied to
the Jama'at, and its sister institution in Malaysia has a strong
Jama'at presence. The Jama'at's aim here has been to influence
the curricula of these institutions and to leave the imprint of its
ideas on the students attending these universities from across
the Muslim world. The party views these projects as a means of
strengthening Islamic unity, both by establishing uniformity in
Islamic learning and by bringing Muslims from many nations
together. That the names of the universities contain the word
“international” acknowledges the diverse origins of their stu-
dents and suggests that they serve a role in relations among
Muslim countries just as much as they serve in educating Mus-
lim youth. It is this that distinguishes between the international
Islamic universities, and universities such as al-Azhar in Egypt
or Imam Ibn Sa'ud in Saudi Arabia where the curriculum can
also be characterized as Islamic.

The United States and the West
On the surface, the Jama'at's attitude towards the United States
and the West displays the anti-Westernism typical of Islamists.
Within Pakistan, the Jama'at has not been alone in this stance,
as Pakistanis have generally been ill-at-ease with their govern-
ment’s pro-Western foreign policy. The Jama’at favored a more “Third Worldist” stance, closer ties with the Muslim world, and openly opposed Pakistan’s membership in defense alliances with Western powers, such as the Baghdad Pact, CENTO, and SEATO. The party viewed these alliance systems as pro-Western, imperialist, and contrary to the interests of the Islamic world. Mawdudi argued that the defense pacts compelled the state to commit itself to westernization domestically, and to follow foreign policies that served the interests of the West rather than reflect popular demands. This opposition was particularly pronounced during Ayub Khan’s strongly pro-American regime.

Beyond this, the extent, function, and rationale of anti-Westernism in general and anti-Americanism in particular are not as clear as they may be elsewhere in the Muslim world. First, the Jama’at always understood that in the Cold War climate that governed regional politics, India’s close ties to the Soviet Union—coupled with Mawdudi’s own distaste for communism—have made the United States important to Pakistan’s geostrategic needs. Second, there are instances, as in the case of Afghanistan, when the Jama’at itself became a party to Pakistani-American geostrategic consensus. The Jama’at’s ties with Saudi Arabia and its pro-Western foreign policy further encouraged the Jama’at in this regard. As a result, for most of its history in Pakistan the Jama’at has maintained an implicitly anti-Western and anti-American stance while it has avoided making the issue a central political concern.

This attitude changed only in the late 1980s, when the party sensed that with the reduction in American aid, the abandoning of the Afghan campaign, and United States indifference to Kashmir, the strategic consensus between Washington and Islamabad was at an end, and hence it was acceptable if not politically profitable to be more openly anti-American. That many Pakistanis viewed Benazir Bhutto as America’s choice made anti-Americanism an important tool in undermining her government. In all this, the Jama’at was voicing sentiments that were aired by mainstream political actors as well. In fact, after
the Muslim League exploited anti-Americanism in the 1990 elections, the Jama'at, too, thought of adopting such a posture to strengthen its political showing. This then culminated in an anti-Western stance on the Gulf War. The party's anti-Americanism therefore has strong domestic roots, tied on the one hand to Pakistani nationalism—which these days is slighted by American policy, which has made aid and arms sales contingent on Pakistan abandoning its nuclear program—and on the other to the party's own interests in the political arena. Still, the party has so far shied away from militancy in its anti-Americanism. On several occasions Qazi Husain Ahmad has addressed directly the issue of Western fear of Islam, arguing that the West has nothing to fear of Islamic movements—at least in Pakistan. More recently, Qazi Husain Ahmad balanced his criticism of the United States with a call for bridge building between Islam and the West. He referred to the comments of England's Prince Charles at Oxford University's Center for Islamic Studies, “I would like to welcome the fresh approach to Islam and the Muslims advocated by Prince Charles. His words have been widely welcomed in the Muslim world,” said Ahmad.

It is likely that the anti-American trend will strengthen in the coming years. The party's secretary-general, Sayyid Munawwar Hasan—who will most likely be the next Amir—is more strident in his opposition to the United States than Qazi Husain. Whereas Qazi Husain used anti-Americanism as a facet of the party's struggle for power, Munawwar Hasan has attempted to make anti-Americanism the bedrock of the party's politics, arguing that Benazir or Nawaz Sharif are only manifestations of the larger American problem. Hasan reasons that the Jama'at should not get bogged down in the tussle with the PPP or the Muslim League but instead should oppose “America's agenda” in Pakistan.

It is important to note that the influence of domestic politics on the Jama'at's attitude toward the United States has not always been uniform. The left in Pakistan is convinced that in the 1970s the Jama'at did the bidding of Washington in masterminding the agitations against Zulfiqar Bhutto.
self openly suggested that the United States was behind the unrest, then named Mawdudi as the most important figure in the opposition’s strategy. In April 1977 he declared, “The elephant [the U.S. government] is annoyed with me,”\textsuperscript{79} suggesting that the United States had orchestrated the mass movement that demanded his removal from power. Later, he went so far as to charge that the Pakistan National Alliance—which consisted of nine parties who opposed his regime and called for fresh elections—and the Jama'a't were being led by American agents who had been ordered to debunk the government because of its socialist and Third World leanings, and because Pakistan’s nuclear program ran counter to American interests in the region.\textsuperscript{80} The accusation brought a sharp rebuke from Mawdudi.\textsuperscript{81}

It is difficult to prove the veracity of such charges, but that they are prevalent in Pakistan is politically significant. For many Pakistanis it means that the party is not as anti-American as its rhetoric may suggest, and that its interests and those of the United States have at times coincided. It also suggests that anti-Americanism, far from a constant in the Jama'a't’s policies, is dependent on the party’s domestic agenda. Needless to say, this has led many Pakistanis to view America’s current wariness of “Islamic fundamentalism” with suspicion.

\textit{International and Regional Organizations}

The Jama'a't has accepted the idea of international organizations in principle. In some cases it has remained neutral, as with the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Turkey-Iran-Pakistan arrangement known as Regional Cooperation and Development (RCD). However, when an international organization like the OIC has served the purpose of Islamic unity, the Jama'a't has lent its full support. Conversely, when the party has judged international organizations to be inimical to Muslim interests, it has opposed Pakistan’s participation in them. For instance, the party opposed CENTO, and more recently has become critical of the United Nations, which it views as biased against Muslim interests in Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, and Bosnia. To some extent, this attitude is reflective
of a shift in the mood in Pakistan as a whole. Since the 1950s Pakistan quite active in the United Nations, even looking to the organization to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In recent years, however, Pakistan has viewed the United Nations as unable to further its national interests and likely to support its enemies, India and Israel.

In recent years the Jama'at has become quite active in its opposition to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since he became Amir in 1988, Qazi Husain Ahmad has been trying to incorporate populism into the Jama'at’s politics with the hope of strengthening its electoral showings. When in 1993 the provisional government of Moeen Qureshi introduced an austerity package recommended by the IMF, the Jama'at quickly took the lead in protesting the rise in prices and cutbacks in social supports and services. Although the party’s aim was to establish a base of support among those the reforms would squeeze, it also used the IMF’s western image to link its own anti-imperialist rhetoric to a new populist stance.

This strategy found more coherent shape in the summer of 1996, when the government introduced its new budget. The IMF had warned that unless Pakistan introduced new taxes to cover the growing government deficit, it would withhold $600 million in new loans. The IMF favored new agricultural taxes that would extract resources from the landed elite, but the government was not eager to precipitate a showdown with that class, and instead sought to cover its deficit through new sales taxes and closing exemptions, all of which affected the industrialists, salaried middle classes, merchants, and lower middle classes. The new measures proved to be highly unpopular and led to demonstrations in several cities. The Jama'at was at the forefront of a number of these protests, characterizing the government’s actions as protection of the wealthy and punishment of the poor. One showdown in Rawalpindi led to the death of four demonstrators at the hands of the police.

The government gave the impression that it had been forced into the new taxes by the IMF, although it never introduced the taxes that the IMF had favored. As a result, the ire of the oppo-
sition was also turned on the IMF. The Jama’at also found the IMF connection useful in depicting the government as beholden to a Western (if not American-controlled) international agency. The power of these arguments may be better understood if one considers the fact that other political aspirants, such as, Imran Khan, who for a time in 1997 posed as a third force in Pakistan’s politics, shaped his political platform around the theme of ending the domination of the landed elite and corruption, and freeing Pakistan of Western economic control.

Since 1996 Pakistan has faced a severe economic crisis. Consequently, IMF demands that the government end subsidies, raise the price of basic staples, and cut the military’s budget have become contentious political issues. The Jama’at has systematically rejected the IMF’s prescriptions as unnecessary, excessive, and tantamount to enslavement. The party has also characterized IMF demands to cut the military’s budget as a sinister plot to weaken Pakistan. Through these attacks the Jama’at not only hopes to fan the flames of anti-imperialism to its own advantage but also to discredit the political establishment that has brought Pakistan to the edge of economic collapse. If those who have precipitated the crisis cannot be trusted to oversee the process of recovery, and if the IMF threatens Pakistan’s very independence, then the Jama’at reasons it is the only political alternative. It is important to note that the Jama’at has found much support in its posture from the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed’s recent attacks on Western economic institutions. Malaysia’s experiment with Islamization and growth has been of great importance to Pakistan, and many Jama’at members and supporters have visited Malaysia and worked there in recent years. As a result, the party has been quick to respond to the rhetoric that has come out of Kuala Lumpur after the Asian economic crisis—blaming Western financial institutions for all economic ills.

In 1998 as IMF prescriptions began to take effect, Qazi Husain renewed his attacks on that institution, posing as the defender of national rights. Claiming to speak for the masses, he warned the government against heeding to the advice of the
IMF. The anti-IMF campaign has allowed the Jama’at to combine populism with anti-imperialism. Qazi Husain hopes that at a time of economic uncertainty and hardship this mixture can translate into street power and better electoral showings.

This has been especially the case after the 1997 elections. The Jama’at did not participate in those elections, and as a result is no longer involved in parliamentary politics; nor is it a participant in the political wrangling in government circles. Its political fortunes are not decidedly tied to agitational politics and the drive to change the current political setup in a fundamental fashion. The party now looks to issues that can mobilize the masses into a broad-based political movement as its path to power. For the party, economic hardships born from the IMF austerity package hold great promise in this regard.

CONCLUSION

The case of the Jama’at-i Islami shows that Islamism does not possess a coherent international perspective. Although Islamist ideology provides some directives for compartmentalizing the world and ordering relations therein, it does not stipulate a clear-cut approach. Islamist ideology emphasizes Islamic unity across national boundaries, but it has in recent years operated through the paradigm of the nation-state system. Still ideology and idealism continue to provide Islamist movements with their vocabulary and perceptions in discussing international issues, as well as with certain tendencies in understanding international events and forces and responding to them. It is also apparent from the case under review here that, whatever impact ideology has on Islamist approaches to international issues, it is conditioned by domestic political imperatives. Finally, the Islamist understanding of international relations has evolved over time and in response to international and domestic events. It may have its roots in ideology, but ideological directives do not totally control its development.

The Jama’at’s conception of international relations is multi-dimensional, the result of a number of causal factors. Ideology
and historical legacy have shaped it, but not exclusively. Pragmatic interests as well as factors exogenous to the party have more directly governed its development. In this regard, the party’s view of the possibilities before it in the domestic political arena, the impact of state policies, and watershed events such as the Afghan war have coalesced to shape its perspective on international relations. How that perspective is likely to evolve, address old as well as new concerns, and develop internal coherence—turn into a systematic approach to foreign policy questions—will continue to be governed by these factors and the complex ways in which they are likely to interact.
NOTES


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16 For details of this episode see Nasr, Mawdudi, pp. 117–19.


19 See Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims Since Independence (London: Hurst, 1997).


21 For dates, a list of translation, and other activities of the translation bureau see Nasr, Vanguard, pp. 79–80.


25 For details of this case see Nasr, Mawdudi, pp. 21–23.


30 Maududi, *Islamic Law*, 171–72; and *Islami riyasat*.


35 These views were espoused by Mahathir Mohamed, his then deputy, Anwar Ibrahim (who was close to the Jama’at), and through government supported institutions such as Chandra Muzafar’s Just World.


38 Interview with Qazi Husain Ahmad in *Resurgence* (Lahore), 4: 1–2 (January–February 1995) p. 5.

[58]
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39 Bahadur, Jama’at-i Islami, p. 133.

40 For an example of this line of argument see Benazir Bhutto, “Transcending Divisions: the Consolidation of Pakistan,” Harvard International Review 18: 3 (Summer 1996) p. 43.


42 Nasr, Vanguard, pp. 116–22.


44 Personal interview with Khurshid Ahmad.


47 Badr, Qazi Husain, pp. 70–71.


49 See for instance, Khurshid Ahmad, “Mas’alah-i Kashmir ka hall, jihad ya muzakirat,” in Asia (Lahore), (February 4, 1990): 15–16, 35. During a speech before students at Punjab University on March 19, 1990, Qazi Husain Ahmad openly advocated the arming and training of Kashmiris in the same manner as was done with Afghan mujahideen.


53 One example of this effort is reflected in Tariq Jan et al., Foreign Policy Debate: the Years Ahead (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1993).


*Resurgence*, 2:9 (September 1993), pp. 1, 3.


See interview with Qazi Husain in *Herald*, (February 1991): 24. Between September 12 and 15, 1990, the Jama'at participated in a pro-Iraq Islamic conference convened in Jordan, following which it demanded that the government recall its 11,000 troops from Saudi Arabia. For greater detail see the debate between the editor of *Tākbir* and Jama'at's leaders over this issue in the magazine's issues of January 31, 1991, pp. 5–57, 50; February 14, 1991, pp. 15–18.

70 For a thorough discussion of Jama’at’s response to the war and these two considerations, see ibid., pp. 155–85.


72 Ibid.


78 Hasan elaborated his position during a nationwide tour of Pakistan in 1998; see for instance, Dawn, April 16, 1998.

79 Niazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, p. 89.

80 Ibid., pp. 89–94. Pakistan’s decision to embark on a nuclear weapons program had created tensions in the relations between the two countries; see, for instance, the alarmist report from U.S. Ambassador, Islamabad, telegram 4065 (April 26, 1978); reproduced in Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den, Nos. 45 and 46: U.S. Intervention in Islamic Countries: Pakistan, 2 vols., (Tehran: Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam, nd.): 45, p. 19.

81 Abdu’l-Ghaftir Ahmad, Pher martial law a-giya (Then Came the Martial Law) (Lahore: Jang Publications, 1988): 194.
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